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Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research 
John 0. Ledyard* 
Environments with public goods are a wonderful playground for those interested in 
delicate experimental problems, serious theoretical challenges, and difficult mechanism 
design i ssues. In this chapter I will look at one small but fundamental part of the rapidly 
expanding experimental research. In Section 1 ,  I describe a very simple public good 
experiment - what it is, what some theories predict, what usually happens, and why we 
should care - and then provide a methodological and theoretical background for the rest 
of the chapter. In Section 2, I look at the fundamental question: are people selfish or 
cooperative in volunteering to contribute to public good production? We look at five 
important early experiments that have laid the foundations for much that has followed. 
In Section 3, I look at the range of experimental research which tries to identify and 
study those factors which increase cooperation. In order to help those new to experi­
mental work I have tried to focus on specific experimental designs in Section 2 and on 
general results and knowledge in Section 3. The reader will find that the public goods 
environment is a very sensitive one with much that can affect outcomes but are difficult 
to control. The many factors interact with each other in unknown ways. Nothing is 
known for sure. Environments with public goods present a serious challenge even to 
skilled experimentalists and many opportunities for imaginative work. 
1 Introduction 
Some of the most fundamental questions about the organization of society center around 
issues raised by the presence of public goods. Can markets provide optimal allocations 
*I thank the Flight Projects .Qffice··Of. the Jet-Propulsion Laboratory of NASA for their financial 
support. For their intellectual help and advice, I thank Peter Bohm, Don Coursey, Robyn Dawes, Roy 
Gardner, Mark Johnson, John Kagel, Jamie Brown-Kruse, Susan Laury, Gerald Marwell, Rosemarie 
Nagel, John Orbell, Elinor Ostrom, Tom Palfrey, Charles Plott, Amnon Rapoport, Al Roth, Tatsuyoshi 
Saijo, Steve Slutsky, Richard Thaler, James Walker , most of the participants in the Conference on Exper­
imental Research on the Provision of Public Goods and Common-Property Resources at the Workshop 
in Political Theory and Policy Analysis at Indiana University, and especially Mark Isaac without whom 
I would not have gotten even this far . Some of these strongly disagree with parts of my commentary. 
They may be justified. 
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of public goods such as air pollution or public health? How well do current political 
institutions perform in the production and funding of public goods such as space explo­
ration or national defense? How far can volunteerism take us in attempts to solve world 
environmental problems? If existing institutions, thrown up in the natural evolutionary 
process of history, do not produce desirable results in the presence of public goods, can 
we discover other organizational arrangements that would better serve the interests of 
society? At an even more basic level, public goods raise issues about the very nature 
of humans. Are people cooperative or selfish? Do they behave differently when con­
fronting public goods decisions than when making private goods decisions? Are altruism 
or fairness concepts that a social scientist must come to terms with before solving the 
organizational problems or can these phenomena be safely ignored? Such questions have 
been argued throughout history on the basis of much introspection and little evidence. 
With the development of an experimental methodology for economics, we now enter a 
new era in the debates. 
1 . 1  A Simple Public Good Experiment 
Perhaps more than in any other area covered by this handbook, it is difficult to identify 
a typical experiment . As we will see, there are as many variations in procedures and 
treatments as there are research groups. For now, let us look at a design that has some 
of the basic features of many and is easy to describe and understand. 
liVhat does a Public Good Experiment Look Like? Four male undergraduates from a 
sociology course are brought to a room and seated at a table. They are each given an 
endowment of $5. They are then told that each can choose to invest some or all of their 
$5 in a group project. In particular, each will simultaneously and without discussion 
put an amount between $0 and $5 in an envelope. The experimenter will collect the 
"contributions," total them up, double the amount and then divide this money among 
the group. The private benefit from the public good, in this case, is one half the total 
contributions which is what each receives from the group project . No one, except the 
experimenter, knows others ' contributions but all know the total. The procedure is 
implemented and the subjects are paid. The data collected, beyond the description of 
the experimental parameters, is simply the amount contributed by each individual. 
liVhat Should. One .Expect .. to.Happen in this Public Goods Experiment? There are 
many theories. One, the economic/game-theoretic prediction, is that no one will ever 
contribute anything. Each potential contributor will try to "free ride" on the others. In 
this theory it is a dominant strategy to choose $0 in the experiment because each $1  
contributed yields only $ .50 to its contributor, no matter what the others do. This i s  
called a public goods problem or a social dilemma because the group would be  best off 
in some sense (taking home $10 each) if all contributed $5. Each $1 contributed yields 
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$1 .50 to the others at no cost to them. From the point of view of this theory, individual 
self interest is at odds with group interest .  
Another theory, which I will call the sociologic-psychologic prediction, i s  that each 
subject will contribute something. Although it is hard to find precise statements, it is 
sometimes claimed that altruism, social norms or group identification will lead each to 
contribute $5, the group optimal outcome. From the point of view of this theory, there 
is no conflict between individual and group interests. 
What does Happen in a Public Goods Experiment? Examination of the data reveals 
that neither theory is right . In many cases, some contribute $0, some contribute $5 and 
some choose a middle course and contribute something less than $5 . .  Generally, total 
contributions can be expected to lie between $8 and $12,  or 40% to 60% of the group 
optimum. The statement in Dawes and Thaler (1988) is "It is certainly true that there 
is a 'free rider problem' . . .  On the other hand, the strong free rider prediction is clearly 
wrong." This lack of precision is disconcerting. They seem to claim that a full range 
of behavior exists from fully selfish to fully altruistic. If so, outcomes in public goods 
environments can be almost anything depending on which subjects walk into the room 
and we can learn no more from further experiments .  More likely, the imprecision of results 
is due to the fact that we have simply not yet achieved sufficient control in our public 
goods experiments to be able to identify what is really happening. It is only recently 
that careful experimental work has begun to uncover how changes in payoff parameters 
and in institutional features can change the amounts contributed for the production of 
public goods. Being able to change amounts contributed by changing treatments means 
some measure of control can be achieved. We are thus beginning to understand behavior 
through better control and a growing accumulation of evidence. 
liVhy should We Care about Public Goods Experiments? Both economists and sociol­
ogists recognize that the desired outcome is for all to contribute $5. The experimental 
evidence suggests that voluntary contributions will not produce that desired outcome. 
Economic  theory suggests1 that it may be possible to change the institutions by which 
group choices are made in a way that ca.uses the outcome to be closer to the group op­
timum. To know how to do that, however, requires anticipating how individual choices 
will change as the institutions change. Since both the economic/ game-theoretic and 
socio-psychologic theoretical predictions are wrong, we need to discover more about be­
havior not only in the context of voluntary contributions but also in the presence of many 
institutional designs. Experiments are the only way to do so. 
1See, for example, Groves and Ledyard (1977) or Ledyard and Palfrey ( 1992) . 
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1 . 2  The Art of Experiment: Sensitivity and Control 
The research problem underlying this survey, then, is to understand behavior in the 
presence of public goods and in the context of many institutions. Once that understand­
ing is achieved, all the other questions we have raised can be answered in a relatively 
straight-forward manner. On a broader level, the search is really for useful principles 
of behavior that apply across all environments and institutions. If we are successful as 
social scientists , we should be able to model behavior in the same way .whether there are 
private or public goods and whether there are markets or committees. On the surface, 
this statement is simply a tautology; on deeper examination, it is the heart of what a 
theorist tries to do. To illustrate, suppose it were shown experimentally that subjects 
behaved differently when instructions were on green paper than when they were on white 
paper. To explain this phenomenon, we could add a parameter to our model of behavior, 
called for example "the color of the pa.per on which instructions are written." Suppose 
our original model of behavior is µ( e ) ;  that is, if the experiment is e we will observe µ(  e ) ,  
and i f  the experiment i s  e' we will observe µ(  e') . If behavior i s  µ 9  when green paper 
is used and µ w  when white is used, the new theory is Jt( e; x) where µ( e; g) = µ 9  and 
µ( e; w) = µ w. This does not , of course, allow us to predict what will happen when red 
is used; µ( ;  r) =?. For that we need a set of principles, a set which allows us to say 
something about behavior for any color. We would ultimately like to be able to say: you 
give me the details of the environment and a complete description of an institution, then 
my model of behavior will predict what will happen. Thus, the study of behavior in the 
presence of public goods should be viewed simply as an extension of the more general 
study of behavior in groups,  examples of which are covered throughout this book. Ex­
perimentalists must believe this, if the results of the lab are to tell us anything about 
behavior in the field. Theorists must believe this, if they are to be able to predict the 
implications of changes in institutional designs. 
One might take this view, that principles of behavior exist independent of environment 
and institution, to imply that there is nothing special about studying behavior in public 
goods or dilemma environments. 2 That would be an incorrect inference. In fact, I think 
these are exactly the right environments for one simple reason: aggregate results and 
measurable aspects of behavior seem to be very sensitive to variations in parameters and 
other treatments. For example, experiments in private good environments, such as the 
work with Double Auctions (see chapter Sunder (1994) )  and bargaining (see chapter Roth 
(1994) ) ,  seem to produce similar predictable results . .independent of the experimenter, 
subject pool, and parameters. Demand-supply equilibria arise in simple markets in spite 
of subject "mistakes" or other characteristics . When one subject errs3 in a Double 
Auction with private goods, another will immediately adjust and take advantage of the 
2There would be something special about studying institutions, though. 
3It is not always obvious what is an error and what is some subtle form of sophisticated play but 
for purposes of this example suppose a seller offers to sell a unit at less than her marginal cost. This is 
either an error (a loss will be incurred) or an altruistic act. We generally treat it as a mistake. 
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mistake but the rest of the group will not be too severely affected. A buyer may take 
advantage of a seller's error but the group still achieves near 100 percent efficiencies. 
Subtleties in behavior are difficult to identify and measure. In public good environments 
this "averaging" or "smoothing" phenomenon can not happen. A misstep by one is felt 
by all and can not be easily corrected. Subtleties in behavior are not only identifiable 
and measurable, they are endemic. Public goods and dilemma experiments appear to be 
the simplest environment within which to uncover variations in behavior in groups.4 
Of course the sensitivity of the experimental medium is a double-edged sword. Control 
is made more difficult. Let me illustrate what I mean. When I was taking freshman 
physics, I was required to perform a sequence of rather dull laboratory exercises (which 
may be one reason I became an economic theorist) .  One standard experiment involved 
rolling a steel ball down a ramp with a ski jump at the end. The trajectory followed by 
the ball was to be filmed, using a strobe camera, so we could plot the parabolic arc of the 
ball and confirm that Newton's Laws were indeed consistent with experimental evidence. 
In an effort to enliven the proceedings, my lab partner and I substituted a ping-pong 
ball we had painted silver and, during its trajectory, we gently blew on it. The resulting 
experimental evidence captured on film, that Newton's Laws appeared to be rejected, 
was indisputable. Nevertheless, the lab instructor rejected the data as inconsistent with 
the theory. More correctly, he did not believe they were replicable with the original 
equipment. Ping-pong balls can allow the experimenter to display effects hidden by the 
insensitivity of metal balls; but ping-pong balls also allow unintended and uncontrolled 
intrusions to contaminate and mislead. 5 
Public goods and dilemma experiments are like using ping-pong balls; sensitive enough 
to be really informative but only with adequate control. For example, the experiment we 
described in Section 1 . 1  is neither particularly elegant nor carefully controlled. Even so, 
at least twelve major choices have been made in creating this design: ( 1 )  the number, 
(2) gender and (3) education of the subjects , ( 4) whether they are face to face or acting 
through computer terminals or in isolated rooms, (5) how much endowment to give to 
each and in what form (cash, tokens, promises, . . .  ) ,  (6) whether discussion is allowed and 
in what form, (7) whether contributions are private or public, (8) by how much to increase 
the total contributions, (9) how to divide up the larger pie (for example, in proportion to 
contribution or to number) , (10) whether or when to announce the results ,  ( 1 1 )  whether 
to pay subjects publicly or privately and finally (12) whether to run the procedure once 
or, say, 1 0  times. Each of these choices represents a potential treatment or control. Each 
treatment has been shown by at least one experimenter to have a significant effect on the 
41 emphasize groups here since single person decision experiments lack the ability to examine com­
plicated feedback effects from interpersonal interactions. 
5Using steel balls allows control but is not very illuminating. 
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rate of contribution.6 This means , there are more than 212 possible designs. 7 Further, 
there still remain uncontrolled phenomena which might affect behavior in the experiment 
such as the experience of the subjects, whether they are roommates or not, the beliefs and 
risk-attitudes of the subjects, and the willingness of a subject to trade decision making 
effort and precision for the dollars to be made in the experiment. In many Double Oral 
Auction experiments8 this lack of control does not seem to be a problem. But , as we will 
see, it causes serious difficulties in the voluntary provision of public goods. 
Experiments with Double Oral Auctions and private goods yield precise replicable 
patterns of data on exchange prices and quantities: markets are easy to control but pro­
vide little insight into individual behavior.9 Experiments with voluntary contributions 
mechanisms and public goods yield imprecise patterns of data on contributions: vol­
unteerisrn is not very easy to control but, perhaps, yields some insight into individual 
behavior. This delicate balance between sensitivity and control is a constant challenge 
to experimentalists. Sometimes the language and theory can be a guide. 
1 .3 The Language of Experiment: Mechanisms and Environ­
ments 
Modern developments in theory and experimental methods have created a framework and 
a language within which to study systematically the questions raised at the beginning of 
this chapter. This new framework, called mechanism design10, also provides an outline 
within which to organize what we know about public goods experiments .  The main 
components featured are environments, outcomes1 performance criteria, institutions and 
models of behavior. To see how these fit together into a coherent and useful framework, 
let us look at them one at a time. 
An environment describes the details of the situation that the analyst takes as given 
and the experimentalist manipulates; the exogenous variables . Included in the environ­
ment are the number of people, or agents, their preferences and endowments ,  the physical 
constraints on behavior (biological and physical laws) ,  those aspects of the legal struc­
ture (such as property rights) that will be taken as fixed, the structure of information 
6In fact, for most of these variables it is possible to find experimental evidence suggesting a positive 
effect, evidence suggesting no effect , and evidence suggesting a negative effect. See Section 3 .  
7Variables such as  number of  subjects and the conversion rate of contributions into public good make 
the possibilities infinite. 
8See chapter Sunder (1994). 
9See Easley and Ledyard (1992) for the extensive range of behaviors which are consistent with the 
data. 
10This structure has been developed over many years by many researchers. Examples can be found in 
Groves and Ledyard (1987) ,  Hurwicz (1972) ,  Myerson (1991) ,  Kiser and Ostrom (1982) ,  Radner (1987) ,  
and Smith (1982a). A complete exposition would require another book. 
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(who knows what and to what extent might that be common knowledge) , the technical 
details and possibilities for production, and so forth. Also included in the environment 
is a description of the range of possible outcomes of interest to agents .  
Outcomes are what the furor is all about . An outcome describes the final distribution 
of resources and payoffs. How each individual feels about the outcome will depend on 
the particular environment since an individual's preferences for outcomes are part of the 
description of an environment. Similarly whether a particular outcome might be good 
for the group will depend on the details of the environment. 
A performance criterion determines, for each environment, a ranking over outcomes. 
The idea is that in each environment the best outcome is the one which is ranked highest 
by the performance criterion. A standard performance criterion used in experimental 
work is a cost/benefit measure11 which computes the sum of payoffs received as a percent 
of the maximum attainable. From a mechanism design point of view, if someone knew 
all the details of the environment (and were benevolent) we could simply ask them to 
announce the best outcome for that environment. One problem that might arise would 
be the difficulty in communicating all relevant details and the complexities in computing 
it .  But one of the main contributions of modern economics is the recognition that infor­
mation about the environment is dispersed and that individuals may have incentives not 
to provide the requested information. Further, even if the information is correctly known, 
self-interested agents may be unwilling to follow the suggested actions. Enforcement is, 
thus, another possible problem. We cannot readily rely on beneficient omniscience. 
Instead, institutions arise to aggregate information and coordinate activities. An 
institution specifies who should communicate with whom and how, as well as who should 
take various actions and when. An example of a very simple institution designed to 
deal with public good production is the Voluntary Contributions Mechanism (without 
communication) in which each individual is told to contribute an amount of a private 
good privately and without any information about what others are doing, as in Section 
1 . 1 .  The level of public good provided then equals that producible with the total private 
good contributed.  The outcome describes the amount of public good produced and the 
amount of each contribution. Given a set of individuals, their preferences and their 
endowments ,  the outcome we observe is the result of both the mechanism rules and 
the choices made by the agents .  Another more complicated institution is the modified 
Lindahl mechanism in which all agents write down a schedule of their willingness-to-pay 
(in private good) for various amounts of a public good. The level of public good is chosen 
to maximize the sum of the willingness-to-pay minus the production cost . Each individual 
is required to contribute (pay) an amount equal to their marginal willingness to pay (for 
that amount of the public good) times the amount of the public good. The outcome 
describes the amount of the public good produced and the amount of each contribution. 
1 1This is sometimes incorrectly identified as efficiency or Pareto-optimality in environments with 
income effects.  
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Figure 1 :  
The possible outcomes for the Lindahl mechanism are exactly the same as those for the 
voluntary contributions mechanism. But the actual values achieved may be very different 
because the choices of the agents may differ in the context of different mechanisms. 
A particularly interesting question is whether the individuals would be better off 
with the voluntary contributions mechanism or with the modified Lindahl mechanism. To 
answer this we must be able to evaluate the performance of these institutions. To evaluate 
how well an institution performs (according to a particular performance criterion) we 
need to be able to predict what outcomes will occur in each environment when that 
institution is used. To do that we need a model of behavior; that is, we need a theory of 
how individuals respond in each environment to requests for information and action by an 
institution. In general, the model will predict different responses in different environments 
to the same institution as well as different responses in the same environment to different 
institutions. 
Figure 1 ,  due to Mount and Reiter (1974) , captures all the components of the frame­
work. E is a set of environments and A is a set of outcomes. P : E � A is the 
performance criterion where P( e) = {a} is a (possibly set-valued) function which identi­
fies the best outcomes for each environment e. The institution is (M, g) where M is the 
language of communication12 and g(m1, ... , mN) specifies the outcomes which are cho­
sen if each,individual i·responds to -theinstitution with mi; The behavioral model is µ 
where µ (e,(A1 , g)) = (m1, ... ,mN) specifies how each individual will actually respond if 
the environment is e and the institution is (A1,g). 
This structure makes it easy to recast our earlier questions in a more precise form 
and to identify a variety of other interesting questions. Let us look at three. (1 ) How 
12This can include iterative procedures, bids and offers, votes, oratory, etc. 
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does a given institution (M, g) perform and does it perform optimally over a range of 
environments; that is, what is µ[e,(M,g)] and does µ(e,(M,g))cP(e) for all ecE? Ex­
amples of this type of question are: do markets efficiently allocate resources in private 
goods economies, and how efficient is the allocation of resources in a public goods envi­
ronment if we rely on voluntary contributions? (2) Is µ a good theory; that is , do we 
observe µ(e, (M,g)) as we vary both e and (M,g)? Examples of these types of questions 
are: do buyers in a first-price sealed bid auction follow Bayes-Nash strategies, and are 
agents in a public goods situation selfish or altruistic? (3) Can we. design an optimal 
mechanism for a class of environments ;  that is, given ( E, P) can we find ( M, g) such that 
µ( e, ( M, g)) = P( e) for all ecE? Examples of this type of question are: how can we fix 
up problems caused by market failure such as air pollution, how should we organize a 
firm, and how should we make decisions about public goods so that desirable outcomes 
occur? If we can simultaneously observe the details of the environment, e, the mecha­
nism, ( M, g), and the outcome for a wide variety of environments and mechanisms, we 
have a chance to answer these questions without ma.king arbitrary assumptions about 
behavior. Experiments provide the opportunity. 
1 .4 The Range of Public Goods Environments 
The range of experiments which have a public goods structure is more extensive than most 
realize. To see why, let me describe some very simple environments with public goods. 
There are two goods, one private and one public, and N individuals. Each individual 
i = 1 ,  . .  , N is endowed with some amount of the private good, Zi. The public good is 
produced from the private according to the production function y = g(t) where t is the 
amount of private good used to produce y. An outcome is a level of public good, y, and 
an allocation of the private good for each a.gent x1, ... , xN. Each agent values outcomes 
according to the utility function 13 Ui (xi, y) .  Feasible outcomes are a = (y, x1, ... , xN) 
such that y = g [ L;{;1 
(zi -xi)]. We will call t i  = zi -xi the amount of i's payment for 
the public good and occasionally restrict the range of possible ti . For example, sometimes 
it is required that t i  E (0, zi] , the endowment is divisible but no one can contribute more 
than zi, nor can they repeat compensation, and sometimes it is required that t i  E {O, zi}, 
either zi is contributed or nothing is contributed. We can summarize the environment 
_ u1 uN 1 N ase-<g, , . . .  , ,z, . . .  ,z >. 
Virtually any public good or social dilemma. experimental environment is a special 
case of e in which specific forms for (g, U1, ... , UN) and specific values for z1, • • •  , zN are 
13This assumes i is "selfish" . We will see later why one might want to relax this assumption. In fact ,  
we will need to  go further and distinguish the payoff to subjects, say pi(xi ,  y) , from the utility they get , 
vi = vi (pi' /3i) where /3i may be a collection of variables which are difficult to observe or control or f3i 
may include the payoffs to others. If we knew f3i then Ui(xi ,  y) = Vi(pi (xi , y) , f3 i ) .  
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chosen. 14 ui is then paid to i based on the choices of Xi, • • •  ' Xn· One special case, 
called the linear symmetric variable contribution environment, has been used extensively 
in experimental research15 and is described by g(t) = ';vt and Ui(xi , y) = pxi + y. It 
is called linear because of the assumption that all Ui and g are linear functions. It 
is called symmetric because a renumbering of the agents should change nothing. It is 
called variable contribution because Xi can be any real number. Another environment, 
called the linear symmetric threshold environment16 is described by g(t )  = 1 if t � t and 
g(t) = 0 otherwise, and Ui(xi , y) = pxi + y. It is called threshold because of the form of 
g .  
There are many other classes of experimental environments which also have the public 
goods structure. For one example, consider the common property resource problem 
of Walker, Gardner, and Ostrom (1990). They study problems "that potentially arise 
whenever multiple appropriators withdraw resource units from a common-pool resource 
(CPR) ." In their experiments ,  individuals are endowed with T tokens and choose to 
invest ti tokens. Each i is then paid hi(t) where 
The idea is that the investment of ti creates a negative externality and lowers the marginal 
physical product of others '  individual investments, tj . To see why this can be thought of 
as a public good environment, let Zi = T, g(t) = 23 - .25t, and Ui(xi , y) = (zi - Xi)y +5xi . 
Here, xi = Zi - ti is the amount of the private good endowment zi which i chooses to 
retain for consumption.17 The fact that dg/dt < 0 should not deter one from recognizing 
the public good nature of this environment . We can further transform variables to make 
the point. Let y* = g* (t) = .25t . Then dg* /dy* > 0. Let Zi = T. Let xi = T - ti = Zi - ti . 
Let U*i (xi, y*) = 5xi + 23( Zi - Xi) - ( Zi - Xi )y*. (In the investment space, one would 
have U*i (ti , y* )  = 5i + 18ti - tiy* . )  Here one might be tempted to call y* a public bad 
because increases in y* yield decreases in U*i . Also there are income effects since 
d[dU*i/dy/dU*i/dxi]/dxi = 
1 -=/= 0. 
y* - 18 
Nevertheless, the fundamental public good structure is revealed by the careful description 
of the environment. This also illustrates that the same economic environment can be 
presented to subjects in many apparently unrelated formats. One hopes that behavior 
would be the same whether hi(t) ,  Ui (xi , y ) , or U*i(ti , y*) is used, but this is rarely checked. 
14This point is also made, with graph in Dawes (1975). 
15This is the basis of Isaac, Walker and Thomas{1984) among others. 
16See D awes, Orbell, Simmons, and van de Kragt {1986) . 
17 An equivalent theoretical representation in the space of investments would yield Ui (ti , y) = t iy -
5ti + 5zi. In each case the initial endowment is a parameter in the utility function but it is exogenous, 
fixed and known so that creates no theoretical problems under standard economic and game theories. 
There may, of course, still be differences in subject behavior when payoffs are presented in the different 
forms h;(t), Ui (t;, y) , and Ui(x;, y) . See Section 4 for more on this problem of presentation . 
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Another example arises in a totally different context . In Cournot Oligopoly models, 
(see, e .g . ,  chapter Holt (1994) ) firms choose quantities% the market price which depends 
on the total amount brought to market is P(Eqi) ,  and firms are paid 'lri = P(Eqi)qi-Ci (qi) 
where Ci(· ) is i's cost function. Let g(t) = P(t) and Ui(xi , Y) = xiy - Ci(xi) to see why 
this is a public good environment . 
I have listed many of the examples I am aware of18 and the appropriate references 
in Appendix A.  One may think it is stretching a bit to include all of these as public 
goods environments ,  but the advantage gained by recognizing that these are all the same 
structure is that it brings more experimental data to bear on the really difficult question: 
what is behavior in the presence of public goods? 
1 .5 What Is And Is Not To Be Surveyed 
The contents of a complete survey on public goods experiments would include material 
from four main categories: (1 )  experiments with voluntary contributions mechanisms over 
a wide range of environments ,  (2) experiments with a wide range of mechanisms over a 
limited class of economic environments, (3) experiments with mechanisms in political 
environments, and ( 4) experiments with applications or policy problems as the focus . 
Category ( 1 )  includes work by sociologists, social psychologists, political scientists , 
and economists intended to isolate fundamental aspects of group behavior when voluntary 
contributions are socially desirable but individually bad. In this paper we will concentrate 
on this category of work.19 
Category (2) includes work primarily by economists aimed at identifying those aspects 
of mechanisms which might lead to socially optimal outcomes even if basic individual 
incentives operate to foil such goals. Much of this work is motivated by the theoretical 
findings of Hurwicz ( 1972) and others.20 A good example of early work in this area 
is found in Smith (1979a, 1979b, 1980) .  A follow-up study to Smith's research can be 
found in Ferejohn, Forsythe, Noll, and Palfrey (1982) . An example of more recent work, is 
found in Banks, Plott, and Porter (1988) . Work from psychology would include Shepperd 
( 1993) .  
Research in Category (3)  has been predominantly generated, as one might expect, 
by political scientists. In political environments ,  no compensation is available to ease 
the group decision making process. As opposed to economic environments in which 
transfers of the private good from winners can be used to compensate losers, in political 
environments there is more of a flavor of multilateral bargaining. A classic example of 
18See S chram and Sonnemans (1992) for another involving voter turnout .  
1 91 will, however, not survey two-person games. 
2°For a recent survey of the theoretical literature see Groves and Ledyard (1987) .  
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this type of research, focusing on the institution of committees, is found in Fiorina and 
Plott ( 1978) .  A survey of more recent work, including institutions based on elections ,  
can be found in McKelvey and Ordeshook (1990) .  
The research in  Category (4) has more of an applied flavor than that in  (1 )-(3) .  Here, 
the experimental lab serves the mechanism designer in the same way the wind-tunnel does 
the aeronautical engineer and the towing tank does the naval architect .21 Mechanisms 
which are created from the imagination of designers. can be tested in a controlled Emviron­
ment . We need no longer be restricted to studying only those organizations thrown up 
by the slow evolution of naturally occurring institutions. An early example of this work 
is Ferejohn and Noll(l976) and Ferejohn, Forsythe, and Noll ( 1979) .  A more modern 
example is Banks , Ledyard, and Porter (1989) .  Here the basic research in mechanism 
design meets the world of everyday problems. Airport slot allocation (Grether, Isaac, 
and Plott ( 1989) , Rassenti ,  Smith, and Bulfin ( 1982) ) ,  coordinating the use of shared 
facilities (Banks, Ledyard, and Porter (1989)) ,  managing the development a.nd opera­
tions of deep space missions (Olson and Porter ( 1994) ) ,  environmental control through 
markets (Franciosi et al. ( 1991 ) ,  Ledyard and Szakaly (1992)) and siting noxious facili­
ties (Brookshire, Coursey, and Kunreuther (forthcoming) , Kunreuther et al. ( 1986)) are 
just a few of the complex organizational problems being attacked. Although this is an 
infant science, I believe that mechanism design and testbedding will ultimately become 
the foundation of policy analysis. 
I do not have space to survey all research across ( 1)-(4) . I have chosen to cover only 
(1 )  - behavior in voluntary contributions mechanisms in public goods environments -
for two main reasons .  First, the research, development, and application of mechanisms 
in (2) , (3), and (4) requires a basic understanding of behavior in group situations. The 
research on voluntary contributions mechanisms is one of the simplest ways to develop 
that understanding. The experiments are difficult to control but are sensitive revealers 
of behavior. Second, the research on behavior with public goods has been aggressively 
multi-disciplinary with excellent programs maintained by22 economists, political scien­
tists, psychologists, and sociologists. Many experiments have been created in response 
to work of others. Several labs have long running programs in which data have been 
generated by systematically varying environments and institutions. The best results do 
seem to come from the more systematic efforts. Perhaps more often than in any other 
area trod by experimental economists23 , research on voluntary contributions has brought 
the fundamental beliefs and hypotheses of economics. into conflict with those of other 
fields. The debate has been joined: the resolution, as we will see, remains in doubt. 
21In an early work (1984) for the Jet Propulsion Lab of NASA on space station allocation, I adopted 
the phrase "testbedding," used by their engineers to describe one phase of spacecraft development, to 
identify this type of experimental organizational analysis. 
22Listed alphabetically. 
23The exception might be in research on decisions under uncertainty (see chapter Camerer (1994)) .  
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2 Are People Selfish or Cooperative? 
Research on the voluntary provision of public goods must come to grips with this simple 
but still unanswered question about the fundamental nature of humankind. The debate 
has been long-standing with much heat and little light. 24 Economists and game-theorists 
argue that the hypothesis of selfish behavior is the only viable one as an organizing prin­
ciple yet they also contribute to public television and vote in elections. Sociologists and 
political scientists argue that societies are naturally cooperative through the evolution of 
social norms or altruism. Preconceived notions bordering on the theological have some­
times been rejected by data. But those who are reluctant to part with cherished theories 
have in turn rejected the data. Disciplinary boundaries have been drawn, breached, and 
redrawn. It is into this fray that experimentalists have come, trying to generate light 
where previously there was little. 
Although many have contributed to the development of our knowledge, the systematic 
experimental effort of three research groups has been fundamental. Marwell in Sociology 
at Wisconsin,25 Dawes in Psychology at Oregon and then at Carnegie-Mellon University 
and Or bell in Political Science at Oregon, 26 and Isaac and Walker in Economics at Arizona 
and Indiana27 have all carried out sustained efforts to understand whether and why 
cooperation might occur in public goods problems. Ma.ny of these still continue the 
study. The result of this effort and the sometimes heated interaction has been just what 
one might hope for; a slowly emerging consensus, which would have been impossible 
without carefully controlled experiments. Let us see how this has happened by trying to 
discover what we know now and why. 
A reasonable reading of the literature28 on voluntary contribution mechanisms and 
social dilemmas would probably lead one to conclude that the major findings to date are: 
1 .  In one-shot trials and in the initial stages of finitely repeated trials, subjects gen-
24For an example of the often silly rhetoric of the debate see Mansbridge (1990). 
25Work from this group includes Marwell and Ames (1979), Marwell and Ames (1980), Alfano and 
Marwell ( 1980), Marwell and Ames ( 1981), and Marwell (1982) . 
26Work from this group includes Dawes, McTavish, and Shaklee ( 1977), Dawes (1980), Orbell and 
Dawes {1981), Dawes and Orbell (1982), van de Kragt, Orbell, and Dawes (1983), Dawes, Orbell, and 
van de Kragt (1985) Orbell, van de Kragt, and Dawes (1988), Dawes, Orbell, Simmons, and van de 
Kragt (1986), Dawes, .van de Kragt! Orbel1"{1987),·0rbell1·Dawes, and·van de Kragt ( 1990), Orbell and 
Dawes (1991) .  
27Work from this group includes Isaac and Walker ( 1983), Isaac, Walker, and Thomas ( 1984), Isaac, 
McCue, and Plott ( 1985), Isaac and Walker (1987), Isaac, Schmidtz, and Walker (1988), Isaac and 
Walker ( 1988a), Isaac and Walker (1988b ), Fisher, Isaac, Schatzberg, and Walker (1988), Isaac and 
Walker ( 1989), Isaac and Walker (1991), Isaac, Walker, and Williams {1990), Walker, Gardner, and 
Ostrom ( 1990). 
28Andreoni (1988b), p. 291 .  See also Isaac and Walker (1987), Mansbridge ( 1990), p. 17, and Dawes 
and Thaler {1988), p .  189, for examples of these claims. 
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erally provide contributions halfway between the Pareto-efficient level and the free 
riding level, 
2. Contributions decline with repetition, and 
3. Face to face communication improves the rate of contribution. 
The first finding suggests the public goods problem is not as bad as·some economists 
make it out to be, but that there is still room for improvement. For those interested in 
creating more desirable outcomes, the second is bad news and the third is good news. 
But, although these are generally acknowledged stylized facts, they should be viewed 
with some skepticism. And, perhaps, others should be added. To see why, let us dig 
deeper. 
The public goods problem, that individual incentives are at odds with group interest ,  
has long been recognized at the theoretical level by economists. Lindahl discussed it29 as 
early as 1919,  Samuelson (1954) conjectured it ,  and Ledyard and Roberts provided a proof 
in 1974. (See Groves and Ledyard (1987) for details) .  At the same time political scientists 
recognized it as a problem of collective action (Olson (1971))  and as the tragedy of the 
commons (Hardin (1968) ), while social psychologists called it a social dilemma (Dawes 
(1980) ) .  But , even though the problem was widely recognized there were few data. This 
allowed wide disagreement about whether there really was a problem. Lindahl ( 1919) ,  not 
recognizing the incentives for misrepresentation, suggested that a bargaining equilibrium 
would arise that was optimal. For a modern version of the argument that the public good 
problem is over-exaggerated see Johansen (1977) . Most economists believed there was 
a free rider problem and that voluntary contributions mechanisms would provide very 
little public goods. Other organizations would be needed. Eventually data were brought 
to bear on the debate but that is a relatively recent occurrence. For example, Marwell 
and Ames (1979) note at the time of their work that "No body of experimental research 
asks explicitly what level of self-denial on behalf of achieving collective goods may be 
expected from some population, and under what conditions this self-denial may vary." 
(p. 1336) The earliest experiment they admowledge30 was reported by Bohm (1972) .  We 
start there. 
2 . 1  Bohm: ·Estimating Demand 
In one of the earliest attempts to discover experimentally whether there is a public goods 
problem, Bohm ( 1972) set up a well thought out test "involving five different approaches 
to estimating demand for a public good." His conclusion after the data were analyzed 
29See Bohm ( 1987) . 
30They identified it as related but not focused on their question of interest. 
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was that "the well-known risk for misrepresentation of preferences in this context may 
have been exaggerated" and people may be willing to contribute to the public good even 
if their own self-interest runs counter. What did Bohm do and was his conclusion correct? 
2 . 1 . 1  Procedures 
Let me first describe his experimental procedures and then explain why his study raised 
more questions than it answered. In his own words: 
The test was carried out by the Research Department of the Swedish Radio­
TV broadcasting company (SR) in November, 1969. A random sample of 
605 persons was drawn from the age group 20 to 70 of the population of 
Stockholm. They were asked to come to the premises of the broadcasting 
company to answer some questions a.bout TV programs and were promised a 
fee of Kr. 50 ($10) for a one-hour "interview." Normally, some 35-50% show 
up in tests of this kind. (Bohm (1972) p. 1 18.31 ) 
After dividing the sample, 
The persons in each subgroup were placed into a room with two TV-sets and 
were, for allegedly "practical reasons," immediately given the fees promised 
them in four ten-Crown bills, one five-Crown bill and small change to make 
Kr.50. The administrator gave an oral presentation of the test which involved 
a half-hour program by Hasse Alfredsson and Tage Danielsson,32 not yet 
shown to the public. The subjects were given the impression that there were 
many groups of the same size simultaneously being asked the same questions 
in other rooms elsewhere in the broadcasting company. The responses, given 
in writing by the persons in each subgroup, were taken away and said to 
be added to the statements from other groups. . . .  The main part of the 
instructions given to groups I to V was as follows: Try to estimate in money 
terms how much you find it worth at a maximum to watch this half-hour 
program in this room in a little while, i .e. what is the largest sum you 
are willing to. pay.to watch it . .. If.the sum· of.the. stated amounts of all the 
participants covers the costs (Kr. 500) of showing the program on closed­
circuit TV, the program will be shown; and you will have to pay 
311 would like to thank Elsevier Science Publishers for permission to quote from this report. 
32Well-known Swedish comedians, 
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(to group I) 
(to group II) 
(to group III) 
(to group IV) 
(to group V) 
the amount you have stated, 
some percentage (as explained) of the amount you 
have stated, 
either the amount you have stated or a percentage (as 
explained) of this amount, or Kr. 5 or nothing, to be 
determined later by a lottery you can witness 
Kr. 5, 
nothing. In this case the participants were informed 
that the costs were to be paid by the SR, i .e. the 
taxpayers in general. 
"Counter-strategic" arguments (see below in Section 2 .1 .3) were added to 
instructions I, II, IV and V. 
The subjects in group VI, who received instructions which differed from the 
instructions to the first five groups, were simply asked how much they found 
the program to be worth at a rnaxirnurn. In a second round, these people 
were asked to give their highest bids for a seat to watch the program and 
were told that the 10 highest bidders out of an alleged group of some 100 
persons were to pay the amount they had bid and see the program. (Bohrn 
(1972) pp. 1 18-1 19.) 
The design of the experiment was intended to test whether, as economists might have 
predicted, group I would understate their willingness to pay and groups IV and V would 
overstate. 
2 . 1 . 2  Results 
The data Bohrn found are surnrnarized in Table 1 .  
They imply that no significant differences (at the 5 % level) could be  found 
between any pair of instructions I to IV. (Bohrn (1972) p .  120. ) 
2 . 1 .3 C omments 
There are three aspects of the design which deserve mention because they suggest a lack 
of control. First , Bohrn does not know and cannot directly measure the true willingness­
to-pay of his subjects to see a specific television show. Since he did not control this 
variable (subjects were not paid but would get to watch the show) he is forced to make 
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Table 1: Amounts stated at instructions I-VI: 2. 
Kr. I II III IV v VI:l VI:2 
0-0.50 1 1 2 5 
0.60-2.5 2 2 4 3 4 4 
2.60-4.50 4 5 2 1 4 4 
4.60-6.50 8 6 15 13 8 10 10  55 out of 70 stating Kr. 5 
6.60-8.50 4 3 2 6 7 3 3 
8.60-10.50 1 7 9 4 8 13  12 All 54 stating Kr. 10  
1 0.60-12.50 1 1 1 3 1 
12.60-17.50 3 1 6 3 1 1  12 35 out of 36 stating Kr.  15 
1 7.60-22.50 3 1 1 1 4 All 10 stating Kr. 20 
22.60-27.50 1 1 3 2 2 8 out of 9 stating Kr. 25 
27.60-32.50 1 1 Both stating Kr. 30 
50 1 
........ Number 23 29 29 37 39 54 54 -.:r 
Mean 7.61  8.84 7.29 7.73 8.78 10.19 10.33 
Standard Deviation 6.1 1  5.84 4.1 1  4.68 6.24 7.79 6.84 
Median 5 7 5 6.5 7 10  10  
probabilistic statements across groups.33 Further, it is impossible for him to distinguish 
between two key hypotheses: no misrepresentation of preferences and simple irresponsible 
responses. He notes that "the reactions received from different groups are compatible 
with the possibility of getting identical (emphasis is his) responses to instructions I to 
V" (p. 124). He also remarks, in discussing group VI but with relevance to group V,  
that "the results are of course compatible with the general view that , when no payments 
and/or formal decisions are involved, people respond in an "irresponsible" fashion. In 
other words, this result may be. seen as still another reason to doubt the usefulness of 
responses to hypothetical questions . . .  " (p .125) . The lack of direct control over the 
fundamental parameter, willingness-to-pay, creates a serious difficulty in knowing what 
to conclude without a significantly large number of experiments with randomly assigned 
subjects so that statistical procedures can substitute for direct control.34 
Second, because he wanted to study the effect of large groups and because he did not 
have much money, Bohm misrepresented the true situation to the subjects. There were 
no other "groups of the same size simultaneously being asked the same questions" and in 
fact the program was always shown no matter what the answers were. The experimenter 
may hope the subjects believe that the group is large, but control may have been lost . 
Bohm is not the only one to adapt this strategy in order to save money. In Section 
3.3 .2 I will discuss the problems of doing experiments with large numbers and one of the 
creative attempts at solution. The problem remains open. 
Third, "the use of Counter-strategic" arguments in experiments is clearly controver­
sial. Instructions IV and V say 
It is easy to see that it would pay for any one of you who really wanted to 
watch this program to state a much higher amount than he actually would 
be willing to pay. In this way the total sum of the amounts stated would 
increase and so would the changes of having the program shown here. But 
this would of course make it impossible for us to find out just how much you 
really think watching this program is worth to you. It could also be said that 
such an overstatement would indicate a lack of solidarity or respect for the 
views of your neighbors, who may be called upon to pay for something that 
is not really desired by all of you together. In other words , it should be seen 
as something of a "duty" to state the amount you actually find it worth to 
see the program. (pp. 128-129.) 
Instructions I and II say, 
33We need to develop an econometrics of experiments to deal with the estimation and identification 
of uncontrolled variables. 
340ther early experiments also had this problem . For example, Schneider and Pommerehne (1981b) 
used students as subjects and the public good was the purchase of the professor's forthcoming book: see 
the discussion of this experiment in Chapter 1 .  
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. . .  it could pay for you to give an understatement of your maximum willing­
ness to pay. But, if all or many of you behave in this way, the sum won't 
reach Kr. 500 and the program won't be shown to you. (p. 128) 
It is  well known now that subjects may actually be trying to do what they think 
the experimentalist thinks they should be doing. Even subtle cues in the instructions 
can cause subjects' decisions to vary. Strong moral imperatives such as those used by 
Bohm are equivalent to blowing on ping-pong balls. There may be economic principles 
involved but we will never find them this way. We might, however, find out whether 
such mechanisms can increase contributions. I will take up a discussion about the role 
of moral suasion in Section 3.5. 
Bohm's imaginative study was, for its time, a major advance in the attempt to identify 
the extent of voluntary behavior in the presence of public goods. Although he tentatively 
concluded that that misrepresentation of preferences was less a problem than believed by 
economists, his experiment was seriously flawed in at least three ways. As a result, the 
data were not convincing and he was forced to conclude correctly that "the test would 
seem to encourage further work in the field of experimental economics." The question of 
cooperative vs. selfish behavior remained open. 
2 . 2  D awes et al.: Soc ial Dilemmas 
While economists were struggling to get their experiments under control, social psychol­
ogists were independently studying a phenomenon which, I would argue, is a special 
case of public goods; social dilemmas. One of the best and most persistent groups has 
included Robyn Dawes and John Orbell. Let us look at Dawes, McTavish, and Shaklee 
(1977) for an example of this type of work that avoids many of the flaws of Bohm. 
2 . 2 . 1  Pro cedures 
The experiment is simple.35 Eight person groups were created although sometimes less 
showed up. A total of 284 subjects were used in 40 groups. Each individual in each group 
marked an X or an 0 on a card in private. They were told36 
If you choose an 0, you will earn $2.50 minus a $1 .50 fine for every person 
who chooses X. If you choose X, you will earn $2.50 plus $9.50 minus $1 .50 
35Simplicity is a good feature of experiments. You are more likely to understand what you have 
learned. 
36The subjects were also asked to indicate beliefs about others' choices. We will comment on this 
aspect of their experiments later in Section 3.4.2 .  
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fine for each person, including yourself, who chooses X. (Dawes-McTavish-
Shaklee ( 1977) pp.4-5 .37) 
Subjects were also presented the payoffs in the form of one half of Table 2. Some 
groups faced the loss condition: Some groups faced the no-loss condition. 
Table 2. Payoff Matrix 
Number Choosing Number Choosing 
Payoff Payoff Payoff Payoff 
to X x 0 to 0 to X x 0 to 0 
Loss condition No-loss condition 
0 8 2.50 0 8 2.50 
10.50 1 7 1 .00 10.50 1 7 1 .00 
9 .00 2 6 - . 50 9 .00 2 6 0 
7.50 3 5 -2.00 7.50 3 5 0 
6 .00 4 4 -3.50 6 .00 4 4 0 
4.50 5 3 -5.00 4.50 5 3 0 
3 .00 6 2 -6.50 3.00 6 2 0 
1 .50 7 1 -8.00 1 . 50 7 1 0 
.00 8 0 .00 8 0 
Four communication conditions were tried, the details on which can be found in 
Section 3 .3 .3 .  After discussions, subjects made a single choice, received nominal payoffs 
in private (but, as shown below, dollar payoffs were determined on the basis of total 
earnings from their friendship group) ,  and were dismissed separately. 
A peculiar aspect, of the experimental design is centered around trying not to force 
subjects to take a loss while at the same time maintaining the standard social dilemma 
structure. Students were recruited in (friendship) groups of 4. This worked as follows. 
Friendship groups met initially with an experimenter who informed them 
that each person would go to a different decision group where she or he 
would make a decision with seven other people. The four friends would then 
return to their friendship group, pool their earnings, and divide them equally 
among themselves. If the total were negative, no member of the friendship 
group would receive anything (although people who did not win at least $2.00 
were contacted later and paid from $1 .00 to $2.50 depending on their initial 
371 would like to thank the American Psychological Association for permission to quote from this 
report . 
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earnings) . One member from each friendship group was sent to each of the 
four communication conditions. Two went to groups in which it was possible 
to lose money (the loss condition) , two to groups in which negative payoffs 
were truncated at zero (the no-loss condition) . Thus the eight groups of 
four friends separated and formed four groups of eight strangers to play the 
commons dilemma game. (Dawes-McTavish-Shaklee (1977) p.4. ) 
The design was intended to identify, among other things, the effect of communication 
on contributions. 
2 . 2 . 2  Results 
The data on non-contributions (X) is displayed in Table 3. 
Table 3. Non-Contribution (frequency of choosing X) 
Condition 
Loss 
No Loss 
Condition 
No Irrelevant Unrestricted 
Communication Communication Communication 
. 73 .65 . 26 
.67 . 70 .30 
(Dawes-McTavish-Shaklee (1977) p .5 . )  
Communication 
Plus Vote 
. 16 
.42 
The main result appears to be (see Dawes (1980)) that only 31 % contribute without 
communication or with irrelevant communication while 72% contribute when relevant 
communication occurs. A secondary but puzzling result is that the no-loss treatment 
had apparently no effect . 
2 . 2 . 3  Comments 
The first thing to notice is that this really is a public good environment a.s described 
in Section 1 .4. Let Zi , the initial endowment , be 0. Require that ti E {O, 9 .50} .  Let 
g(t )  = [ (12/9.5)t]/8 . . .  Finally, let Ui(ti , y) = Zi - ti + g(t) .  Then, for example, if 2 
individuals contribute, their t = 9 .50, and 6 do not, their t = 0, then contributers 
receive Ui = 0 - 9.50 + [(12/9.5) (2 x 9 .50)/8] = -6.50 and non-contributers receive 
Ui = 0 - 0 + (12/9.50) (2 x 9.50)/8 = 3 .00. Compare this to Table 2 under the loss 
condition. 
A second observation concerns the lack of impact of the no-loss treatment . Let us 
look first at the structure of the problem. In the loss condition (ignoring for now the 
21 
complication created by membership in a friendship group) ,  a decision to defect gains a 
subject $8 and costs everyone else $1 .50. Alternatively spending $9.50 by cooperating 
generates $1 .50/person, no matter what others decide to do. In the no-loss condition, the 
situation is very different. The marginal cost and gain of a decision to defect by choosing 
X now depends on the number of other defectors choosing X. This is calculated in Table 
4 .  
Table 4 .  
# defectors marginal cost marginal cost marginal gain 
other than you to other defectors to other cooperators to you 
0 1 .50 1 .50 8.00 
1 1 .50 1 . 00 8 .00 
2 1 . 50 0 7.50 
3 1 .50 0 6 .00 
4 1 .50 0 4.50 
5 1 .50 0 3.00 
6 1 .50 0 1 . 50 
7 1 .50 0 0 
Thus in the no-loss condition the marginal cost a subject imposes on others by de­
fecting is no larger than in the loss condition and is much less on cooperators. One 
should expect this to induce more defection ceteris paribus. But the marginal benefit to 
a subject from defecting is also reduced if at least 2 others defect. This would induce, 
perhaps, less defection ceteris paribus. One way to understand the puzzling fact that the 
no-loss treatment had no effect is to realize that for the subjects in these experiments 
the two countervailing effects could easily have cancelled each other. 
Another way to measure the tension between the selfish gain from defecting and the 
public gain from contributing is to calculate the per subject return from switching $1  to 
contributions.38 For these experiments this is simply oui I [)ti or, in the loss condition, 
1 . 5/9.5. In the no loss condition the algebra. is somewhat different. If there are, say, 5 
other defectors, then if I contribute I lose $3 and those 5 gain 1 . 5  each. Other contributors 
gain nothing. Therefore the per ca.pita gain per $ is 5'!'5 · � ·  These calculations are made 
in Table 5. 
Thus if the subject expects the number of other defectors to be less than 4,  then the 
no-loss condition should raise the incentive to defect by lowering the marginal gain from 
cooperating. Similarly, if the subject expects more than 3 other defectors ,  the no-loss 
38Isaac, Walker , and Thomas (1984) call this the marginal per capita return (MPCR) and were the 
first to identify this very important parameter. More on this later in Section 3 . 3 . 1 .  
22 
Table 5. 
# other loss no loss 
defectors return on $1  return on $1  
0 . 158 . 158 
1 . 158 . 12 
2 . 158 .05 
3 . 158 .093 
4 . 158 . 16  
5 . 158 .3 
6 .158 .75 
7 . 158 00 
condition should lower the incentive to defect by raising the marginal benefit of con­
tributing.39 As can be seen the incentive effects of the no-loss treatment are complex and 
out of control. This should give experimentalists reason to pause. A relatively simple 
appearing alteration in the payoff structure, replacing negative numbers with zeros, cre­
ates a very complex change in the incentive structure because the direction of the effect 
depends on the subjects' expectations which are not controlled by the experimenter.40 
A third observation is that the fear of losses on the part of the experimenters that 
led them to create friendship groups and no-loss conditions could have been avoided by 
recognizing that the experiment is almost identical to that described in Section 1 . 1  if an 
initial endowment of $9.50/subject had been provided. Of course that would have cost 
an additional $9.50 x 284 or about $2,700. An alternative way to save money and to avoid 
forcing subjects into losses would have been to add $9.50 to each entry (so all payoffs are 
non-negative) and then divide all entries by some number to lower the total paid out.41 
39In the extreme case if 7 others plan to defect then each subject faces no cost from contributing but 
can provide 1 .50 to the others by doing so. 
40I have not had the time to figure out in what way this might explain the data on predictions of 
others' behavior. Dawes et al. claim defectors expected more defection than did cooperators. But the 
incentive structure suggests that the no-loss incentives would lead those who expect defection by others 
to defect less often than those who expect more cooperation. It is further claimed by Dawes et al. that 
The possible loss manipulation was not only ineffective in eliciting differential cooperation, 
it was ineffective in eliciting differential predictions about others ' behavior as well. (Dawes­
McTavish-Shaklee (1977) p .  5.) 
I remain suspicious and believe this needs more investigation. 
41 For example, a rough calculation for these Dawes experiments suggests a payoff of $3. 75 to 5 .5 defec­
tors and -$5 .75 to 2 .5 (=.3x 8) contributors for a total of $52.50. A similar calculation for communication 
suggests $ 1 .25 to 5 .5  ( = .7x8) contributors and $8.25 to 2 .5 defectors for a tota.1 of $137.50.  Adding $9 .50 
to each of 8 payoffs would yield a cost for each trial of 76+137.50=$223 .50 . Dividing by 2 would then 
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A modicum of salience is lost , but one avoids the lack of control from treatments such 
as the no loss payoff table or the use of friendship groups to "average" payoffs across 
trials. Budget constraints force experimentalists to make these choices all the time, and 
the ability to control payoffs, allows one to analyze the potential impact of the choices. 
The last observation concerns the most obvious and least informative result : relevant 
talking matters a lot , but although four different types of communication were tried the 
data provide little information as to why. Just letting subjects talk in an uncontrolled 
framework opens up the chances for all sorts of contamination and unintended effects. 
Are facial expressions important? Which ones? Would one get the same effect if each 
subject just could say "zero" or "one" once and simultaneously? Would it matter if "zero" 
were changed to "I won't contribute" and "one" were changed to "I will contribute" ? If 
we are to understand the role of communication in encouraging voluntary contributions, 
we need better control and precision in our experimental designs. This remains an open 
problem. The state of the art is described in Section 3 .3 .3 .  
2 . 3  Marwell et al .: The Free Rider Problem 
During the same time as and independently from Dawes, McTavish and Shaklee (1977), 
Gerald Marwell was initiating the first systematic experimental research program on the 
determinants of the voluntary provision of public goods - or as he put it on "a fun­
damental sociological question: when will a collectivity act to maximize its collective 
interest even though such behavior conflicts with a course of action that would maximize 
the short-term interests of each individual separately." Not just trying to demonstrate 
that "the effects of free-riding were much weaker than would be predicted from most 
economic theory," the Marwell group tried to determine what affects the rate of contri­
bution. In the process ,  they tested the distribution of resources, group size, heterogeneity 
of benefits, provision points, strength of induced preferences, experience of subjects, the 
divisibility of the public good, and the economics training of the subjects. This was a 
carefully thought out research program focused on an important phenomenon. The data 
generated could not be ignored. In fact it was in response to this study that experimental 
economists finally began laying the groundwork needed to study free riding. No longer 
would provision of public goods be just a theoretical debate. 
2 . 3 . 1  Pro cedures 
High school students were contacted by telephone and given tokens which could be in­
vested in a private exchange yielding 1¢/token or in a public exchange yielding an amount 
have cost on average $111 .75 for communication trials and $64.25 for non-communication trials. The 
total for each pair would then be $176, a saving as opposed to the original $190. Table 2 would then 
have entries such as a payoff to X=7.25 and a payoff to 0=3.00 if X = 4 and 0 = 4. 
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depending on the total contribution to the public exchange. In the words of the experi­
menters :  
The experiment was conducted during a single summer and fall using 256 high 
school students between the ages of 15 and 17. Subjects were divided into 
64 four-person groups, resulting in eight groups assigned to each treatment 
condition . . .  Since each group contained two female and two male subjects, 
each cell contained 16 males and 16 females42 High school-age s�bjects were 
selected for study because we felt that the amount of money at stake in 
their decision (about $5.00) would be most meaningful to young people and 
that at the same time these subjects would be old enough to understand the 
investment decision they had to make. (Marwell-Ames (1979) p. 1341.43) 
The study was performed in a "natural" setting, in that all interaction with 
the subjects was by telephone and mail, with subjects remaining in their 
normal environments throughout the course of the research. 
After willingness to participate had been established by phone, the subject 
was mailed a set of instructions appropriate to the experimental condition to 
which he or she was assigned . . .  
Within a few days an experimenter telephoned the subject to go over each 
point in the mailed instructions. This discussion usually lasted 15-20 minutes 
. . .  An appointment was then made for another telephone conversation the 
next day (or as soon as possible), in which the subject could invest the study 
tokens. 
In this next telephone call the subject invested the tokens in either of two ex­
changes (which are explained below) or split them between the two. (Marwell­
Ames ( 1979) pp. 1342-43) 
The payoff table, given to the subjects, for a large group44 of 80 with unequal benefits 
(designated blue and green) and unequal resources is provided in Table 6 .  
One unusual feature (corrected and tested in Marwell-Ames (1980)) about this in­
duced valuation structure is ·the peak at 7 ;999 ,total ·· tokens. At all other levels the 
marginal benefit from contributing 1 more token (worth 1¢) is less than 1¢ whereas at 
42This is a Marwell-Ames footnote: "One male subject named Chris was inadvertently classified as 
female and the mistake was not discovered until long after completion of the experiment . Thus, one 
group was composed of three males and one female. Deletion of this group or this subject makes no 
meaningful change in the results." 
431 would like to thank the University of Chicago Press for permission to quote from this report. 
44How a group of 4 becomes a group of 80 is discussed below. 
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Table 6 .  Payoff from Group Exchange in Large, 
Unequal-Interest, Unequal-Resource Groups 
How Much Money You Get 
If You Are ($) 
If The Total Tokens Invested Total Money Blue Green 
In The Group Exchange By Earned By The (2�¢ of Each (9/10 ¢ of Each 
All Group Members Is Group Is ($) Group Dollar) Group Dollar) 
Between: 
0 and 1 ,999 tokens 0 0 0 
2,000 and 3,999 14.00 .32 . 1 3  
4 ,000 and 5,999 32.00 .72 .29 
6,000 and 7,999 54.00 1 .22 .49 
8,000 and 9,999 320.00 7.20 2.93 
10 ,000 and 1 1 ,999 350.00 7.88 3.21 
12,000 and 13,999 390.00 8.78 3.57 
14,000 and 15,999 420.00 9.45 3.85 
16 ,000 and 17 ,999 440 .00 9.90 4.03 
18,000 450 .00 10 . 13 4 .12 
7 ,999 the marginal benefit is about 6¢. This means there are multiple Nash equilibria. 
One at which no one contributes (the strong free rider hypothesis) and a bunch where 
everyone contributes partially. For example, if all contribute 4/9 of their tokens then a 
total of 8 ,000 from 18,000 is contributed. If the initial endowment is equally distributed 
then each begins with 225 tokens so each is contributing 100 tokens at a cost of $1 and 
receiving a marginal return $5.98. Because of this feature, which Marwell and Ames call 
a provision point, not contributing is no longer a dominant strategy and, at least in the 
equal distribution case, contributing 44% on average is an obvious focal point . 
Group size was varied between 4 and 80. In small groups there were a total of 900 
tokens and in large groups there were a total of 18,000 tokens. In some small groups one 
individual might have as many tokens as the provision point and everyone knew this .45 
But as in  the Bohm experiments some of this was a fiction. 
Group size was specified as "small" when there were four members in the 
group and "large" when there were 80 members. However,  no individual was 
actually a member of a group of 80 persons. All groups contained just four real 
subjects. Because group members never interacted with one another it was 
45Theory suggests in this case that one Nash equilibrium involves only that person contributing. 
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possible to tell them that there were any number of members in their group 
and have them make their investment decisions in terms of this assumption. 
Telling half our subjects that they were in large, SO-person groups was the 
only element of deception in this experiment . (Marwell-Ames (1979) p. 1345. 
2.3.2  Results 
The finding claimed by Marwell and Ames was "a lack of support for . . .  the strong free 
rider46 . "  Approximately 57% of available resources are invested in the public good. If 
those subjects whose endowments are greater than the provision point are excluded, then 
the contribution rate is 41 %. 
In all , tests of the hypotheses derived more or less directly from the economic 
theory support a very weak free-rider hypothesis, with the proviso that groups 
containing a member whose interest is greater than the cost of provision 
invest substantially more in public goods than do other groups. No other 
hypothesized process demonstrated a substantial effect on group investment . 
(Marwell-Ames (1979) p. 1352) 
A second finding which we will examine more closely in Section 3.4. 1 .  was that the 
rate of contribution was less if initial endowments were unequal. 
2 .3.3 Comments 
A number of issues are raised by this study. Many have since been addressed either by 
Marwell's group (see Marwell and Ames (1980) ,  Alfano and Marwell ( 1980) , and Marwell 
and Ames ( 1981) )  or by the economists who initially thought something must be wrong 
if there was so much contribution. 
The existence of a provision point could quite obviously have increased contributions 
to 44%. But in a later study by Marwell and Ames (1980) the provision point was 
removed as in Table 7. 
The result reported after the change was that "the subjects averaged 113  tokens 
invested in the group exchange or approximately 51 % of the tokens they had available." 
(p. 932) This would seem to blunt the criticism that subjects were focused on a focal point 
equilibrium. However, notice that multiple Nash equilibria still exist at positive levels of 
contribution. For example at 1 ,999, 3 ,999, etc. a 1¢  contribution yields a personal return 
46The strong free-rider hypothesis is that everyone contributes zero to the public good 
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Table 7. Payoffs from Group Exchange 
Previous Study Present Study: 
Provision Point No Provision Point 
If The Total Tokens How Much How Much 
Invested In The Total Money Money You Get Total Money Money You Get 
Group Exchange By All Earned by ( 1�¢ of Each Earned by ( 1�¢ of Each 
Group Members Is Between: The Group Is Group Dollar) the Group Is Group Dollar) 
0 and 1 ,999 0 0 0 0 
2,000 and 3 ,999 14.00 . 18 44.00 .55 
4,000 and 5,999 32.00 .40 88.00 1 . 10 
6,000 and 7,999 54.00 .68 132.00 1 .65 
8,000 and 9,999 320.00 4.00 176 .00 2.20 
10,000 and 1 1 ,999 350.00 4.38 220.00 2 .75 
12,000 and 13,999 390.00 4.88 264.00 3.30 
14,000 and 15,999 420.00 5.25 308.00 3 .85 
16,000 and 17 ,999 440 .00 5 .50 352.00 4.40 
18,000 450.00 5 .63 396.00 4.95 
(Marwell-Ames ( 1980) p. 931) 
of 55¢. So if the others contribute some a.mount between 1 ,946 and 1 ,999 or 3 ,946 and 
3 ,999, etc . ,  it pays one to contribute up to 54 tokens. That means there can be many 
equilibria. Of course, this still does not explain why individuals are contributing 113  on 
average instead of something between 1 and 54. 
A smoother, more continuous payoff schedule would not have this property but would, 
perhaps, be harder to explain to the subjects. An extremely important methodological 
question for experimentalists concerns the presentation of the payoffs to the subjects. 
Does the form matter? Are tables better than graphical presentation? Are functions 
impossible to use? What if there are four dimensions and graphs and tables become 
unwieldy? I do not know of any systematic study of these issues47 although it is widely 
recognized, for example, that changes in the placement of information on a computer 
screen, the amount and form of feedback , and the complexity of instructions all can lead 
to changes in behavior. It is vitally important to understand these effects if one wants 
to control induced valuations . The sensitivity of the public goods environment strongly 
highlights these presentatioll' effects. 
A second observation echoes one I made in Section 2. 1 on Bohm's research. Even 
though groups were actually of size 4, half of the subjects were told they were in a group 
470ne study that suggests this is important is Saijo and Yamaguchi ( 1992) which is discussed in more 
detail in Section 4. I have also learned recently of the work of Schwartz-Shea and Simmons ( 1987) but 
have not had time to incorporate it into this paper. 
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of 80. Since all of the experimental interaction was over a phone, no subject could know 
for sure what the group size was other than relying on the veracity of the experimenter. 
How do we know for sure what the subject believed? Since the experimenter was de­
ceptive �bout N=80, why not about N=4? It is believed by many undergraduates that 
psychologists are intentionally deceptive in most experiments .  If undergraduates believe 
the same about economists, we have lost control. It is for this reason that modern exper­
imental economists have been carefully nurturing a reputation for absolute honesty in all 
their experiments .  This may require costlier experiments where not just 4 subjects but 
80 are paid. It may require more clever procedures to get 80 subjects together at one 
time. But if the data are to be valid ,  honesty in procedures is absolutely crucial. Any de­
ception can be discovered and contaminate a subject pool not only for that experimenter 
but for others. Honesty is a methodological public good and deception is equivalent to 
not contributing. It is important for the profession to remember this, especially since, as 
John Kagel pointed out to me, it is conventional wisdom that economists free ride. 
2 . 4  Ec onomists Begin to Reac t 
The work of Marwell and Ames described in section 2 .3 provided stark and clean evidence 
against the standard economic predictions: data confirmed that subjects contribute and 
do not all fee ride. The research caught the attention of the new economic experimental­
ists who had been focusing on markets and who felt sure that the study by sociologists 
must be flawed. Theory could not be that wrong, could it? 
In this section we will look at two studies which were created in direct response 
to Marwell and Ames. Indeed the purpose of both Kim and Walker (1984) and Isaac, 
McCue, and Plott ( 1985) was to show that Marwell and Ames were wrong and "to explore 
the behavior of groups within a set of conditions where we expected the traditional model 
would work with reasonable accuracy." (Isaac, McCue, and Plott ( 1985) p. 51 . )  By this 
they mean they expected to find free-riding and underprovision of the public good, a 
:finding that would be at odds with Marwell and Ames (1979, 1980) and Dawes, McTavish, 
Shaklee ( 1977) . 
2 . 4 . 1  Pro cedures 
The main divergence of both Isaac, McCue, and Plott and Kim and Walker from Marwell 
and Ames was the introduction of repetition; that is , subjects faced the same decision 
process for a series of periods rather than just making their decisions once. We will 
describe the Isaac, McCue, and Plott experiment .48 
48Kim and Walker is covered in Section 2.4 .3 .  
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A total of nine experiments were conducted . . .  
Subjects were guaranteed a minimum of $5.00 for participating. Before the 
instructions were read, subjects were endowed with the $5.00 and told that all 
earnings in the experiment would be paid in addition to that initial amount . 
. . . Each subject was assigned one of the two payoff conditions . . .  called 'high' 
and ' low' payoff condition . . .  The earnings of a subject in a period was the 
individual's payoff as determined by the level of public good provided that 
period and the individual's payoff chart minus the amount the individual 
contributed toward the provision of the public good that period. Thus, the 
total earnings of an individual during the experiment was the initial payment 
guarantee plus the sum over all periods of the earnings for each period . 
. . . there were ten subjects in each experiment (except experiments 4 and 9) 
half of which had the high payoff condition and the other half had the low 
payoff condition. the public good was supplied at a constant marginal cost 
of $ 1 . 30. (Isaac-McCue-Plott (1985) p.53.49) 
Subjects were given a table which indicated both their marginal payoff and total 
payoff at each level of the public good from 0 to 40. The functions which generated these 
marginal payoffs, where q is the amount of the public good actually chosen, were $.44-
0 .0llq for the high types and $ .276-0.00Sq for the low types. Given this environment 
the optimal group allocation, which maximizes total payoff, is at q=23 or 24. The Nash 
equilibrium is q=O and it is a single-period dominant strategy for both types not to 
contribute. 
The decision process for the primary voluntary contributions process proceeds 
as follows. At the beginning of a period each subject privately wrote on a slip 
of paper the amount (s)he wished to contribute to the jointly provided public 
good that period. The paper was collected by the experimenter. The sum 
of these contributions by the subjects was calculated by the experimenter 
and was divided by the (constant) cost of the units to obtain the level of 
the project funded. The level of the project thus funded was announced and 
used to determine each individual subject 's monetary payoff from the payoff 
chart. This payoff determination was made privately by each individual. The 
subjects recorded the payoff amount on a form provided as a part of the 
instructions. The earnings for a subject were calculated as the difference 
between the monetary payoff determined by the level of the public good and 
the contribution made by the subject for the provision of the good. A brief 
period was allowed for the computation of this profit before the next period 
began. 
491 would like to thank Elsevier Science Publishers for permission to quote from this report . 
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There were two standard rules regarding the information of participants: first , 
the subjects were not allowed to communicate with one another during the 
experiment. Secondly, the individuals had no knowledge about the nature 
of any payoff charts other than their own. In a technical sense it was public 
information that no one had information about other subject preferences. 
Furthermore, it was public information that the final period was known with 
certainty to no one. (Isaac-McCue-Plott ( 1985) p. 57.) 
2 . 4 . 2  Results 
Did Isaac et al. find evidence that contradicts the Marwell-Ames results? The answer is 
yes and no. In the first period decisions, contributions strongly resemble those observed 
by Marwell-Ames. On average first period contributions yield a public good level of 8 .8 
which yields a group payoff of 50% of the maximum possible. So the first decisions of sub­
jects are similar in both studies. However, by the fifth period the average number of units 
provided has dropped to 2 .1  for a group payoff which is 9% of the maximum. So, after 
repetition, one can observe significant underprovision and the free-riding phenomenon. 
2.4.3 Comments 
The relatively high initial contribution ra.te which declines with repetition has been found 
by others and is discussed in more detail in Section 3 .2 .  Kim and Walker (1984) with 
a similar design found contributions provided 41 % of the maximal group payoff in the 
first period and declined to 1 1  % by the third period. I have not emphasized their study 
more because, although they were extremely careful to try to eliminate nine experimen­
tal design features of earlier studies which they argued might be invalidating factors, 50 
they misled their 5 subjects hoping they would think there were actually 100 subjects.51 
Whether the subjects believed that or not is unknowable. 
An innovative feature of both the Isaac-McCue-Plott and Kim-Walker experiments 
was the use of a declining marginal payoff curve (in the public good) for each subject and 
no constraint on contributions within a period imposed by an initial endowment of tokens 
(just a total capital constraint across all periods) .  Such a payoff structure means that the 
private incentives not to contribute increase as the others' contributions increase. Let us 
look at that incentive. For the high types, contributing one dollar more to public good 
provision yields i .�o units of the good which yields an extra benefit , to that individual, of 
m = (.44 - . Ol lq) i .�o ·  When q = 0, m = .3385, when q = 10 ,  m = .25, and when q = 24 
(the group maximal amount) m = . 13 .  For low types we have m = .2123 when q = 0, 
50 "Factors which, if  they intrude into the experimenta.1 situation, will render the theory 
. . .  inapplicable" (p .  11 ) .  Such factors involve a loss of control by the experimenter . 
511  have indicated in Section 2 .3 .3  how I feel about this design to save money. 
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m = . 158 when q = 10  and m = . 0646 at q = 24. Since m < 1 for all q it is a dominant 
strategy not to contribute. m - 1  measures the marginal gain from contributing $1 ,  1 - m  
measures the marginal gain from withholding $ 1 .  We will see in the next section that m 
is an important variable52 in determining the extent of contributions. To see whether .34 
is large, let us compute the similar statistic for Dawes et al. (in Section 2.2) .53 Under 
the loss condition (see Table 2) contributing by choosing 0 instead of X is equivalent 
to spending $9.50 privately to gain an extra $ 1 .50/person. Thus, m = 1 .5/9.5 = . 158. 
Equivalent numbers are computed for the no-loss condition in Table 5. Isaac, McCue, 
and Plott do not seem to have chosen parameters with incentives not to contribute any 
stronger than Dawes et al. One might , therefore, conclude that the low contribution rate 
is attributable to repetition. 
That leads to a final comment. The fact that repetition is an important treatment is 
good to know but there is no way to know why it is from this paper. 54 Are subjects learn­
ing? If so, are they learning how to compute dominant strategies or how to interpret the 
payoff tables or whether the others are "fair" or . . .  ? Maybe the decline in contributions is 
simply the result of complicated strategic decisions and/or attempts at signaling.55 Rep­
etition confounds the one period gains from contribution with the multiple-period gains 
from communicating. Controls must be created to disentangle strategic and learning 
effects from each other. Finally, one might wonder whether the decline in contributions 
is an attempt to punish "unfair" behavior by others, but one must also then wonder how 
that could be proven. We will take up some of these issues in Section 3.2. 
2 . 5  Isaac et al.: Systematic Study by Ec onomists 
By 1981 , the results of Dawes et a.1 . ,  Marwell-Ames, Kim-Walker, and Isaac-McCue­
Plott were fairly well known. The work of the first two groups suggested that free riding 
was at best a weak phenomenon in single decision situations; the work of the last two 
groups seemed to suggest that free-riding was an important and strong phenomenon in 
repeated situations. It was time to try to figure out what was really happening. One 
of the first systematic studies truly designed to reconcile and understand the reasons 
for the range of seemingly divergent experimental results was that of Isaac, Walker, and 
52Isaac, Walker, Thomas (1984) were the first to identify and study this effect systematically. Their 
work is described in Section 2 .5 .  
53In Marwell-Ames (1980) there is  not a smooth marginal contribution function, so it is  not obvious 
what the appropriate m would be. One might compute an average where every 2 ,000 tokens yields 
.55/person so m = . 0275 . This seems very small but it did not deter contributions. 
54 A similar comment applied to communication in the Dawes et al. experiment described in Section 
2 .2 .  
55Isaac-McCue-Plott point to a phenomenon they call "pulsing" - a contribution larger than in a 
previous period - and conjecture it may be an attempt to get others to cooperate. No one knows for 
sure as "pulsing" has never been systematically isolated and studied. 
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Thomas (1984) . Isaac and Walker continue today in systematic efforts to understand 
behavior in voluntary contributions situations. I include a description of their first work 
here because of the craftsmanship with which it was designed. But even with a careful 
design they were left with many unanswered questions. In particular they conclude that 
"free riding is neither absolutely all pervasive nor always nonexistent . . .  The extremes of 
strong free riding and near-Lindahl optimal behavior can and do occur." (p. 140 . )  So 
we still do not know what to expect - anything can happen. 
Nevertheless because of the care taken, we do learn something about the existence of 
" . . .  systematic effects of attributes of the decision setting upon the existence 
of free riding . . .  General theories about the importance of free riding are not 
failing because of some inexplicable randomness in previous experiments." 
(Isaac-Walker-Thomas ( 1984) p. 125. ) 
2 . 5 . 1  Procedures 
Four undergraduate students at the University of Arizona were brought into a room 
and each was assigned to a (PLATO) computer terminal . All communication, including 
instructions to the subjects, was done through the terminals. As they indicate 
One feature of this set of experiments that differs from the previously cited 
experiments is the use of the Plato computer system for conducting the ex­
periments. This system allows for minimal experimenter-subject interaction 
during experimental sessions as well as insuring that all subjects see identical 
programmed instructions and examples for a given experimental design. The 
use of the computer system also facilitates the accounting process that occurs 
in each decision period and minimizes subject's transactions costs in making 
decisions and recalling information from previous decisions. (Isaac-Walker­
Thomas (1984) p .  116 . )  
Continuing the description: 
The programmed instructions described to the participants the following de­
cision problem: given a specific endowment of resources (tokens) participants 
faced the decision of allocating them between an individual exchange (pri­
vate good) and a group exchange (public good) . The individual exchange 
was described as an investment which paid to the investor $ .01 for each to­
ken invested . . . .  The group exchange was explained to the participants as an 
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investment which yielded a specific return per token to the individual as well 
as the same return to all other participants. . . .  The payoff from the group 
exchange was reported to each participant in the form of a table which gave 
group and individual returns from the group exchange for various investment 
levels (from zero up to the total tokens owned by the group. ) 
The information position of each participant can be described as follows: 
First , each participant knew his own endowment of tokens for each decision 
trial and the total tokens for the group. He did not know the specific allocation 
of tokens to other participants. Second, participants knew the exact size of 
the group and that each participant return from the group exchange was 
identical. Each participant knew with certainty his own return from the 
private exchange. Participants were not informed that all other participants 
received the same return per token from their contributions to the private 
exchange. Third, each participant knew there would be 10  decision trials 
and his endowment for each trial would be equal. Finally, it was explained 
that the monetary gains from each trial were binding and total payments to 
the participant equaled the sum of his return for the group and individual 
exchanges totaled over all ten trials. At the end of each trial the participant 
received information on his return from the individual and group exchange. 
They were also told the total number of tokens contributed by the group to 
the group exchange. Before making an investment decision in any one trial, a 
participant could obtain this same information for all previous trials. (Isaac, 
Walker, and Thomas (1984) , pl17 . )  
Isaac, Walker, and Thomas were interested in identifying factors which increased or 
decreased free-riding and they chose four particular ones: repetition, group size, marginal 
payoff and experience. They, of course, hoped to control for all else. 
Here each participant knew there would be exactly 10 periods and the participants' en­
dowments and payoffs would remain constant across the repetitions. Group size was easy 
to control: They chose N = 4 and N = 10 .  But keeping all other possible effects constant 
proved more challenging. In particular, they discovered that keeping the marginal indi­
vidual payoff (a measure of selfish gain) constant and simultaneously keeping the marginal 
group payoff (a measure of altruistic gain) constant was impossible. Algebraically, the 
payoffs in this experiment were ui = p(z - ci) + � (2:=  ck) .  The marginal individual gain 
from contributing a token is �·  Normalize by the cost , p and get P°N = 111. This is simply 
the marginal rate of substitution of the private for the public good, y = 2:::: ck . That is 
M = 
-:1�1if:�. Isaac and Walker call this the marginal per capita return.56 The marginal 
group return, computed from 2:::: ui = p(N z - 2:::: ci) + a (L:::: ci) is � ·  If we increase N and 
change nothing else then the incentives for individual interest increase relative to the 
56We saw this variable in Section 2.4.3 .  
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incentives for the group interest .  If we increase N but keep M constant by increasing a 
then the incentives for the group interest increase relative to the incentives for individual 
interest .  It does not seem possible to change N without changing the incentives between 
group and self interest .  Isaac, Walker, and Thomas deal cleverly with this by considering 
a 2 X 2 design with N =4 or 10 and M =.3 or .75 .  Always p=l . Then, since a =  NM, 
we have four parameter choices (N, M, a) : (4, .3 , 1 . 2) ,  (4, . 75,3) , (10 , . 3,3) , and (10, . 75,7 .5) .  
These allow comparing a change in N keeping M constant (for both M=.3 and M=.75) 
and comparing a change in N keeping a =3 constant. 
Finally, experience is measured as previous participation in similar experimental ses­
s10ns. 
2 . 5 . 2  Results 
The only extant formal theory at the time of these experiments predicts no contributions. 
That is clearly false as can be seen in Table 8 and Figure 2. 
Ave. % contributions for 
M= 
.3 . 75 
N= 4 19 57 
10  33 59 
Figure 2. 
Table 8 .  Data for IWT ( 1984) 
Period 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Ave. 
% contrib. (all) 51 .1  47.2 44. 1  47.4 46.7 38.1 40.6 35.2 35.8 37.3 42.4 
% contr.(M=.3) 43 35 28 32 26 25 20 17 20 17  26 
% contr.(M=.75) 60 59 60 63 67 51 61  53 52 57 58 
% contr.(inexper. )  53 53 45 50 55 43 50 41 39 44 47 
% contr.(exper.)  49 41 43 45 38 33 31 30 33 30 37 
% contr.(N =4) 50 50 38 40 38 30 36 32 38 30 38 
% contr.(N =10) 56 50 40 41 41 34 32 33 37 35 40 
The average % contribution across all treatments is 42% and the average across first 
periods is 51 %. These look very much like Dawes et al. and Marwell-Ames. But the 
variance is high, with contributions ranging from 0% (period 8 with M =.3,  N =4, ex­
perienced subjects) to 83% (period 5 with M=.75, N=4, and inexperienced subjects) . 
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So something more than just 40-60% contribution is going on. There are three obvious 
conclusions. First , increasing M from .3 to .75 increases the rate of contribution in all 
cases. The effect is dramatic and strong and in the direction one should expect when 
the strength of the private (selfish) incentive is reduced relative to the public (altruistic) 
incentive. Second, experience matters with inexperienced subjects contributing more. 
This suggests that some form of learning may be occurring. Finally, repetition decreases 
and group size increases contributions for low M =.3 but neither seem to have any effect 
if M=.75. 
2 . 5.3 Comments 
This experiment epitomizes the difficulties in doing experimental research in public goods . 
One can identify general effects which cause free riding but there are always cases which 
contradict the general finding. For example, the strongest effect seen in this experiment 
was that a decrease in M will cause contributions to drop yet in the first period of 
N=lO,  M=.3 and experienced subjects there were 46% contributions whereas in the first 
period of N=lO, M=.75 and experienced subjects there were only 44% contributions. 
The change in M had no effect. This may say more about the random nature of first 
period play than it does about the systematic effect of M, but we do not have enough 
evidence to know for sure. The experimental design is really carefully thought out , one 
of the best, an attempt is made to control the obvious confounding variables and yet the 
data are not that precise and conclusions are hard to draw out . The lack of any helpful 
theory beyond calculation of marginal rates of substitution prevents a precise analysis of 
the obvious interaction effects between variables. One experiment will not be enough; a 
history of comparable efforts may be needed before we fully understand what helps or 
hinders volunteerism. 
A second comment foreshadows the rest of this chapter. The fact that repetition and 
group size have a noticeable effect when M =.3 but not when M = . 75 signals a real 
difficulty with public goods experiments and our ability as economists to extract useful 
information from these experiments .  To see why, let me try to summarize what we know 
to here. 
2 . 5 . 4  A Summary to this Point 
We have looked at six major experiments that have studied behavior in public goods 
environments .  Three57 claim to have established that selfishness is not as rampant as we 
might have expected while three58 claim to have established that altruism has no staying 
57Bohm (1972), Dawes, McTavish, and Shaklee (1977) , and Marwell and Ames (1979) . 
58Isaac, McCue, and Plott (1985) ,  Kim and Walker (1984) , and Isaac, Walker, and Thomas (1984) . 
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power. It seems pretty easy to demonstrate that subjects contribute. All experiments 
have periods with at least 40% contributions. But determined experimenters also seem 
to be easily able to extinguish most but not all of the altruistic impulse (if that is what 
it is) through low marginal payoffs and repetition. We need to better understand the 
causes of these observations. But none of these experiments is truly comparable with 
any of the others. Look at the summary of the designs and results in Table 9. At least 
two features, sometimes more, change between any two experiments. 
Table 9. Summary of Designs and Results 
B DMS MA IMP 
Numbers 7* 8 4,80* 10 
Marginal Payoff ? . 16 ,  . 16- .75 non-linear .34b- .06 
Repetition no no no yesc 
Provision Point yes no yes no 
Tokens no l /person yes no 
Heterogeneity ? no no, yes yes 
Experience no no no no 
Communication no yes, no no no 
Moral suasion yes no no no 
% contributions 
initial period NA 31%a 41% 50% 
last period NA NA NA 9% 
*= deception played a role. 
?= uncontrolled. 
a= w/o communication. (It was 71% with communication. )  
b= declines as q increases. 
c= subjects did not know number of repetitions. 
Note= Two entries mean both treatments were tried. 
B = Bohm (1972) 
DMS = 
MA = 
IMP = 
KW = 
IWT = 
Dawes, McTavish, and Shaklee (1977) 
Marwell and Ames (1979) 
Isaac, McCue, and Plott (1985) 
Kim and Walker ( 1984) 
Isaac, Walker, and Thomas (1984) 
KW 
100* 
.02b , .05, 
.07 
yesc 
no 
no 
no 
no 
no 
no 
68% 
8% 
IWT 
4,10 
.3 ,  . 75 
yes 
no 
yes 
no 
yes, no 
no 
no 
51% 
19% 
The two closest designs may be Marwell and Ames (1979) and Isaac, Walker, and 
Thomas (1984) but even they differ in marginal payoff, provision point , and repetition. 
The difference in designs implies that sometimes subjects contribute and sometimes they 
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do not . The research problem is to discover when and why. I suppose that if one had 
all the data from these six studies one could do some complex multivariate statistical 
analysis , but experiments are supposed to free economists from that necessity. 59 
Our task would be easier if there were significant comparability across experiments 
and experimentors .  However as we will see in Section 3, there is precious little and, 
perhaps as a result, a lot of uncertainty still remains about behavior in public good 
environments. 
3 What Improves Cooperation? 
In Section 2 we looked at some of the pioneering efforts in the experimental analysis of 
behavior in the presence of public goods. We found that not everyone free rides all the 
time. That subjects would voluntarily provide public goods in some situations is amply 
demonstrated by Dawes et al. ,  Marwell et al. ,  and the early periods of Isaac et al. This 
early work also identified two factors which seemed to improve cooperation: relevant 
communication (by Dawes et al. )  and increases in the marginal payoff for contribut­
ing (by Isaac et al. ) .  One factor which seemed to decrease cooperation, repetition, was 
also identified (by Isaac, McCue, and Plott) .  As one can see from Table 9 in Section 2, 
there were at least six other factors which were deemed potential influences on behavior: 
numbers , provision points, number of tokens, heterogeneity of payoffs and endowments, 
experience, and moral suasion. Of course one might think of many other factors and 
the next cohort of experimentalists have done just that . It is time now to try to under­
stand the state of the art today. In Section 2 I tried to give the reader an idea about 
how experiments with public goods have been conducted; in this section I am going to 
concentrate on what modern experimental research has discovered and, therefore, where 
the next work might begin. 60 The reader is strongly encouraged to consult the original 
papers if they want to know the details of the experimental designs. 
One of the major goals of research on public goods is to discover the nature of the 
relationship µ(e, (M, g)) = {a} : that is, contributions = µ (environment , mechanism) . 
The issue is not so much honest revelation of preferences as it is what level of public goods 
will be provided by subjects and how is that affected by environment and mechanism. In 
Table 10 ,  I have listed 19  variables various researchers have identified as having an effect 
on the level of contributions. I have found it useful to group the variables identified 
59In a.n extremely interesting paper, Sally (1992) took 130 treatments from 37 studies and ran a 
regression with % contribution as the dependent variable. He found significant positive coefficients 
for moral suasion, frequency of discussion, solicitation of promises by the experimenter, and (perhaps 
surprisingly) whether players earned money. He found a significant negative effect for marginal payoffs. 
His R2 were about .7 to .8 . However , I think he missed some interesting experiments and variables. 
601 cover about 40 papers in this section. I apologize to the authors I leave out .  I just ran out of time 
and space. 
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by existing research into three main categories : the environment (numbers, strength 
of incentives, extent of homogeneity, thresholds imposed by the production technology, 
initial information structure, gender, . . .  ) , systemic variables (fairness concepts, altruism, 
risk attitudes, beliefs ,  . . .  ) , and design variables (such as unanimity rules, structured 
communication, and moral suasion) . The variables in the first two categories are aspects 
of what I have called the environment: I have split them into two parts to emphasize that 
some are more easily controllable with current experimental technologies. In particular, 
those identified as environmental are relatively straightforward to control, while those 
listed as systemic are currently more difficult. The variables in the category, labeled 
design variables, are factors identified by experimentalists which should be more properly 
thought of as aspects of institutional design. These variables are amenable to change and 
the mechanism designer can use them to improve solutions to the free rider problem. 
In Table 10 ,  I summarize what seems to be the consensus of experimentalists about 
the effect of a change in one of these variables on the change in total contributions as a 
percent of the efficient level. Some effects are more certain than others , in that replication 
has confirmed initial findings. Understanding behavior would be easier if each of these 
variables had a separable and identifiable effect on contributions. 61 Unfortunately that 
is not true: the details of the environment seem to matter. Left unexplained in the table 
are what I call cross-effects. The latter are very important and not well tracked in the 
literature. 62 In some cases, cross-effects may even reverse the direction of effect of a 
variable. We will see this below. 
I organize the rest of this chapter as follows. In Section 3 . 1 ,  I describe a very important 
structural feature in environments with public goods which must be tracked in order to 
make comparisons a.cross experiments. In Section 3.2, I take up results dealing with 
repetition and the related issues of learning and experience. In 3.3 ,  I cover the strong 
effects of marginal payoff (and its related problem of numbers) and communication. In 
3.4, I turn to weak effects. In 3.5, I discuss some of the factors which may be important 
but of which little is known primarily because an inability to control their impact on an 
experiment . In Section 4, I conclude with some final thoughts on what we really know 
and where we might go. 
611 have in mind here something like the robustness of the supply-demand equilibrium with private 
goods. (See chapter Holt (1994)) .  
62For example, the effects of changes in the marginal per capita return seem to vary depending on 
group size. See Isaac and Walker(1988b) and Isaac, Walker, and .WHliams (1990) . 
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Table 10. Stylized Facts 
Effect on %C Section 
I. ENVIRONMENT - easy to control 
MPCR (marginal per capita return) ++ 3.3 
Numbers 00 3 .3 
Repetition 3.2 
Common knowledge + 3.4 
Gender 0 3.4 
Homogeneity (symmetry) + 3.4 
Thresholds + 3 . 1  
IL SYSTEMIC - difficult to control 
Beliefs + 3.4 
Economics Training 3.4 
Experience 3.2 
Friendship/ Group identification + 3.4 
Learning 0 3 .2 
Altruism, fairness ? 3.5 
Effort ? 3.5 
Risk A version ? 3.5 
III. DESIGN VARIABLES 
Communication ++ 3.3 
Rebates + 3.3 
Unanimity 3.4 
Moral Suasion ? 3.5 
* + means increase, 0 means no effect, - means decrease, and ? means 
that I do not believe these have even been measured yet . A double 
symbol means the effect is strong and apparently replicable. A single 
symbol, other than ? , means the effect is apparently there but weak 
and difficult to replicate. 
3 . 1  Thresholds and Provision Points 
To compare data across experiments one must recognize that there is a fundamental 
difference in the structure of incentives when a threshold or provision point exists from 
when it does not . Without a threshold the voluntary contributions mechanism is usually 
a Prisoner's dilemma game; with a threshold it becomes a game of Chicken. See Table 1 1 .  
In the former it i s  a dominant strategy63 not t o  cooperate and there i s  (usually) a unique 
non-cooperative equilibrium which is not Pareto-optimal. In the game of Chicken there 
63 A strategy is dominant if it maximizes the return to an individual no matter what his opponents 
do. That is, if player i's strategy is s and the others ' strategies are x and i 's payoff is u(s ,  x) then the 
strategy c is dominant if and only if c solves maxu(c, s) for all possible s. 
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are generally many non-cooperative equilibria, each of which may be optimal, and none 
of which is dominant , and the task of the players is to coordinate their actions to select 
one. The environments of Dawes et al. ( 1977) and of Isaac and Walker ( 1988b) are of the 
prisoners' dilemma variety. The environment of Marwell and Ames (1979) is more like a 
game of chicken. It is not surprising that we see different results in these two types of 
environments .  For example, if the players can talk one might suspect that in the game of 
Chicken they would correlate their strategies. This is even easier in repeated play because 
they can then try to equalize sacrifice . .  But one might expect that communication would 
have a lesser effect in dilemma games since there is no problem of coordination. 
Table 1 1 .64 
Prisoner's Dilemma 
(MPCR=.75) 
Chicken 
(require lC) 
D 
D 4,4 
c 3,7 
payoffs 
D 
c 
c D c 
7,3 D 4,4 10,6 
6 ,6 c 6,10 6 ,6 
(row player, column player) 
do not contribute, defect 
contribute, cooperate 
For now let us address the simpler problem: do thresholds cause contributions to 
increase, ceteris paribus. One often sees campaign targets set when raising funds for 
charities or university endowments .  Do these work? We do not have much evidence but 
what there is seems to suggest that increases in thresholds increase contributions but also 
increase the probability the target will not be reached.65 There are many papers reporting 
on experiments with thresholds but six actually vary the threshold to determine its 
effect.66 Marwell and Ames (1980) actually compare contributions with and without the 
provision point discussed in Section 2.3. They found no significant difference. However, 
as we mentioned in Section 2 .3 .3  there remained a problem: while they did eliminate the 
major jump in payoff at 8 ,000 tokens, in their no-provision point design there are still 
actually 9 provision points since the payoff is constant across 2,000 token intervals. (See 
Table 7 in Section 2 .3 . )  What changed was marginal payoff at each provision point: some 
64In the Prisoner 's dilemma, each player's dominant strategy is D .  There is one Nash equilibrium: 
(D,D). In Chicken, there are two Nash equilibria: (D,C) and (C,D). There are no dominant strategies. 
See Chapter 1 for an early history of these experiments. 
65So if you are running a campaign you want a high enough target to encourage contribution increases 
but low enough to prevent failure to attain the goal . This is the fund-raiser's art. 
66These are Marwell and Ames ( 1980) , Dawes, Orbell, Simmons, and van de Kragt (1986), Isaac, 
Schmidtz , and Walker (1988) , Rapoport and Suleiman (1993) , Suleiman and Rapoport (1992) , and 
Palfrey and Rosenthal ( 199la) .  
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increased and some decreased. So it is not obvious in what direction the provision points 
are moving. Isaac, Schmidtz ,  and Walker (1988) provides a better study of this problem 
in the context of the Isaac, Walker, and Thomas (1984) design described in Section 2.5. 
They consider three different provision point levels and keep all else constant , such as 
repetition and marginal payoff. This is done by paying subjects pi (zi - ci) + A ·  ;,, (E d)  
where A = 0 if E ci < T, A = 1 if E ci ;:::: T and T is the threshold or provision point . 
They find that increases in T increase contributions but also increase the proportion of 
times that E ci < T. They also find that the increase in contributions disappears with 
repetition so the failure of provision because E Ci < T eventually dominates. Suleiman 
and Rapoport ( 1992) confirm this with a similar study. The main difference is that they 
provide a payoff of ui = Pi (Zi - ci ) + Ar; that is , the return from the public good67 is 
independent of the total contributions. They also found contributions increased with T 
and the probability of provision decreased.68 The numbers are reported in Table 12. It 
is not obvious from these data what the efficiency, E ui divided by the max possible, 
levels were. Dawes, Orbell, Simmons, and van de Kragt ( 1986) report similar results 
when subjects make an all or none contribution one time only.69 Here everyone could 
contribute $5 or $0. If at least J{ of 7 contributed, everyone got $10 :  contributors end 
up with $10 ,  non-contributors receive $15. They find that for J{ =3, 51 % contribute and 
for J{ =5, 64% contribute. I could not calculate the provision proportions from the data 
reported. 
Table 12 .  
ave. contributions provision % 
10 53% 85% 
Threshold 15  66% 80% 
20 73% 39% 
So increases in thresholds seem to increase the percent contributed and lower the prob­
ability of provision. But in a followup study Rapoport and Suleiman (1993) report results 
that could cause one to worry about accepting this proposition too quickly. Changing 
the experiment by randomly assigning the endowments Zi to be 3 ,4,5,6, and 7, they found 
that changes in the threshold had no significant effect on the percent contributed. With 
N=5, the average individual contributions were 54%, 63%, and 60% for T=lO ,  15, and 20 
respectively.70 The provision percentages were 80%, 65% and 12% respectively. Palfrey 
67In the experiments reported 1· =10,  Zi =5, and T =10,15 ,  or 20. N=5. 
68They also had repetitive trials but since no information or feedback was provided between trials, 
the repetition had no apparent effect. 
69Suleiman and Rapoport ( 1992) actually test whether requiring an all or none payment affects the 
rate of contribution. They find that contributions increase if Ci is not restricted to be all or none. Palfrey 
and Prisbrey ( 1993) have a similar finding for a non-threshold environment . 
70What did have an effect on the average contributed was the introduction of heterogeneity. More on 
this in Section 3.4 .  
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and Rosenthal ( 199la) find similar ambiguities in a heterogeneous environment. There 
N =3, marginal payoffs are heterogeneous ,  and each agent has one token. The threshold 
is J( of N. They find that % contributions increase as J( is increased from 1 to 2 but 
decrease as J( is increased from 2 to 3. 
In the Palfrey and Rosenthal ( 1991a) framework, pure strategy Bayesian equilibrium 
theory predicts a decrease from J( =1 to 2 and from J( =2 to 3 for their parameters. 
However, a careful look at mixed strategy equilibria for these environments with thresh­
olds suggests that game theory would predict that changes in the threshold can have an 
ambiguous effect on changes in contributions. See, e.g. , Palfrey and Rosenthal ( 1988) .  
The ambiguity is resolved only when specific parameters are known. The theory is telling 
us we should not expect a definitive answer to "does an increase in threshold increase 
contributions" which is independent of other factors. The data are supporting that view. 
3 . 2  Experienc e, Repetition, and Learning 
A natural explanation for the large rate of contribution in many voluntary contribution 
experiments can be found in the inexperience of the subjects. Perhaps a 40-60% con­
tribution rate occurs simply because if one must contribute a number between 0 and Z 
and does not understand the implications of the act then a natural choice is somewhere 
in the middle.71 This would be especially true of experiments such as Isaac-Walker in 
which payoffs are linear. Clearly it is important to be able to discover whether the data 
are simply the result of confusion and inexperience or the result of some more purposeful 
behavior. One way to do this is to create payoffs such that the two key points of interest , 
the dominant strategy contribution and the group optimum contribution are moved to 
the interior of [O, 100) . That is discussed in Section 4. We explore another way here. 
Repetition (not replication) has become a common feature72 of much research in 
experimental economics in an effort to eliminate or control for at least two types of 
experience effects: learning how to play the particular class of games, such as what keys 
to press in a computerized continuous auction or how to read a particular payoff schedule, 
and learning about the specific game one is in, such as what the environment is and what 
the other subjects are like. One can easily control for the first type of experience by simply 
bringing back subjects who have previously participated in similar experiments .  This has 
not been done as often as one might suspect. The .data from Isaac, Walker, and Thomas 
(1984) and Palfrey and Prisbrey (1993) suggest that subjects who have previously been 
in a voluntary contributions experiment contribute less than those who are first-timers 
71 An alternative yielding the same data would be to randomize between contributing 0 and contribut­
ing z. This, however, does not appear to be supported by individual data. But I am not sure whether 
a more diffuse contribution strategy based on random behavior can be rejected since one only sees 
realizations and not the strategy itself. 
72 At least 25 of the 40 or so papers reported here have used this technique. 
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but still more than zero. Palfrey and Prisbrey (1993) suggest that experience does not 
actually have a significant effect on the % of contributions, because, although experienced 
subjects contribute less ,  they also make fewer errors . They also find that experienced 
subjects are more responsive to MPCR. Two other studies which control for experience 
this way (Marwell and Ames (1980) and Isaac, Schmidtz, and Walker (1988)) however 
find no significant effect . There was a threshold in the latter two and not in the former. 
Does that explain the different data? We do not know. 73 
Significant decreases from repetition in non-threshold environments are reported by 
Isaac, Walker, and Thomas (1984) , Isaac, McCue, and Plott ( 1985) , Isaac, Walker, and 
Williams (1990) for N=4 and 10, Brookshire, Coursey, and Redington ( 1989a) , Kim 
and Walker (1984) , Brown-Kruse and Hummels ( 1992) ,  Banks, Plott, and Porter ( 1988) ,  
Sell and Wilson (1990) , Andreoni ( 1988b ) ,  and Isaac a.nd Walker (1987) . Experiments 
in which repetition had no effect 74 and there was no threshold are reported by Isaac, 
Walker, and Williams (1990) for N=40 and N=lOO and by Palfrey and Prisbrey (1993) . 
In experiments with thresholds the results are considerably more mixed. Bagnoli and 
McKee (1991) report a positive effect on contributions , Palfrey and Rosenthal (199la) 
report a small drift towards Nash equilibrium, and Suleiman and Rapoport ( 1992) and 
Isaac, Schmidtz, and Walker (1988) report a negative effect . From a theoretical per­
spective the natural question is not whether contributions decline but rather whether 
convergence to Bayes-Nash equilibrium is occurring. With no threshold, the equilibrium 
is zero contribution and convergence seems to be empirically verified (at least for small 
N) . With a threshold,  there are usually multiple Nash equilibria so the convergence ques­
tion is more clouded: we need to look at details other than simple increases or decreases . 
Since the data and theory for the no threshold environments a.re more straightforward 
let us concentrate on those for now. 
The data suggest there is a deterioration in contributions after some number of it­
erations. Is this clue to strategy or experience? From a theoretical point of view, one 
must consider significantly different models depending on which is really happening. It 
is possible to construct a model in which there is a very small probability that some 
subjects are not fully rational (i .e. , they use dominated strategies) and in which even 
fully rational selfishly maximizing subjects , even perhaps economists, would contribute 
all or most tokens-at least in the early periods. Towards the last iteration, the ratio­
nal players will not contribute. Thus, one should observe the development of a bimodal 
distribution in contributions as iteration continues. Isaac, Walker, and Williams (1990) 
have data somewhat like this in large groups of 100. Such a theory can be found in 
Kreps et al. ( 1982) and McKelvey and Palfrey (1992) . If, on the other hand, subjects are 
simply trying to learn (by some suitable groping process) what the appropriate one-trial 
73In another attempt to control for inexperience Dawes and Orbell ( 1982) let some subjects think 
about the problem for a day. It did not matter. There was no threshold .  See Section 3 .5 .  
74Saijo and Yamaguchi ( 1992) report both decreases and no effect depending on the details of the 
payoff schedules. More on this in Section 4. 
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strategy is, given this environment and this collection of subjects, then a better model 
would be something like a learning algorithm found in Miller and Andreoni ( 1991 ) ,  Boy­
lan (1990) , Crawford and Haller ( 1990) ,  or Kalai and Lehrer (1990) . If everyone learns ,  
then one should observe the contributions converge to the non-cooperative equilibrium 
after enough periods. This seems to happen after 1 0  iterations in small groups .  We do 
not know how long it would take in large groups .75 
The experimental puzzle is to develop designs which allow separation of these two 
types of temporal phenomena and help us identify those aspects of the institution which 
speed learning or channel strategy when that is desirable. Andreoni ( 1988b) represents a 
good start on this complicated problem. In a unique design he compared two treatments 
called Strangers and Partners in an Isaac-Walker environment with p=l ,  :r=.5 ,  N=5, 
and Zi=50 all of which were known to everyone. The Partners played repeatedly 10 times 
just as in Isaac, Walker, and Thomas (1984) . The Strangers were 20 subjects randomly 
reassigned by computer to groups of 5 after each repetition. The idea was to separate 
strategic play by Partners from no strategic play with Strangers. Thus one should see 
only learning in the Strangers condition but see learning and strategy in the Partners 
condition. The data are in Table 13 .  (Andreoni (1988b )76 )  
Table 1 3 .  Average Investment in  Public Good per Subject 
Round · 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 All 
Partners 24. 1 22.9 21 .5 18 .8 18.4 16 .8 12 .8 1 1 .2 13 .7 5 .8 16 .6  
Strangers 25.4 26.6 24.3  22.2 23. 1  21 .9  17 .8 19 .7 14.0 12.2 20.7 
Difference - 1 .3 -3 .7 -2.8 -3 .4 -4.7 -5 .1  -5 .0 -8 .5 -0.3 -6.4 -4. 1 
Surprisingly, contrary to received strategic theory, Partners contribute less than Strangers 
and the difference increases over time. Andreoni further argues that since there is no 
reason Strangers should learn slower than Partners, learning alone is not responsible for 
the observed decay in contributions. But strangers are in a noisier environment and, 
therefore ,  may indeed learn more slowly. A strategic hypothesis , that giving occurs early 
because it generates more later, appears to be inconsistent with the data. A learning 
hypothesis may be ok. That decay in contributions occurs with repetition in environments 
with a zero dominant strategy is indisputable. What explains the phenomenon remains 
to be found. Follow up research is needed. 
75Isaac, Walker, and Williams are apparently now running some experiments for up to 60 decision 
rounds which may provide some answers. 
761 would like to thank Elsevier Science Publishers for permission to quote from this report. 
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3 . 3  Strong Effec ts 
In this section I want to concentrate on identifying those factors which, like repetition, 
have a well documented effect on contributions in the voluntary provision of public goods. 
There are really just two factors that fall into this category: one environmental, marginal 
payoffs, and one institutional, communication. I will, however,  include a discussion of 
numbers and rebates since their effects are virtually impossible to disentangle from those 
of marginal payoffs. 
3.3.l Marginal Payoffs and Rebates 
Two of the variables most easily controlled in public goods experiments are the marginal 
benefit of the public good relative to the private and the number of subjects in a group. In 
terms of our general model, an agent 's payoff is ui( wi - ti , g('Etj ) ) .  To see the incentives 
for contributing, differentiate with respect to ti , and get -u� + u�gz . Normalizing by 
u� yields -1  + 
(� )9z · It is the product of the marginal rate of substitution, ( utf u�) ,  
and the marginal "'rate of transformation, 9z , which determines the marginal incentive 
to contribute. Isaac, Walker, and Thomas (1984) called this product the marginal per 
capita return, MPCR. For their environment, it = p( w - t) + y and g('Etj ) = 'fr(Litj) and, 
therefore, MPCR=(�) ('fr) .  In Isaac, Walker, and Thomas (1984) and Isaac and Walker 
( 1988b) they began a systematic exploration of the effect of changes in MPCR on rates 
of contribution. As was evident from the data presented earlier in Section 2.4, Table 8, 
increasing the MPCR from .3 to . 75 increases the rate of contribution independent of 
N for N=4 or 10 . Thus, although the strong game-theoretic prediction of free riding is 
false, subjects do appear to respond to incentives in a predictable and systematic fashion. 
Does other research confirm this? Unfortunately not very many other experimentors 
have controlled the marginal payoff (MPCR) to assess its effect on contributions. But 
those that have generally find observations consistent with the hypothesis that marginal 
incentives matter.77 Kirn and Walker (1984) increase marginal payoffs, in the midst of 
their experiment, after repetitions 3 and 1 1 .  Their MPCR changes from .02 to .05 to .07. 
Each change is accompanied by a significant increase in contributions. Brown-Kruse and 
Hummels ( 1992) confirm the effect for MPCR=.5 and .3 .  Saijo and Yamaguchi (1992) 
confirm the effect for MPCR=.7 and 1 .43.78 
771 use marginal incentives here to contrast it with what h� been called the strength or salience of 
payoffs. That would mean increasing the rate at which subjects are paid while keeping the marginal 
payoffs constant. For the Isaac and Walker environments this would mean increasing a and p while 
keeping : constant . 
78 At . 7 it is a dominant strategy to contribute nothing. At. 1 .43 it is a dominant strategy to contribute 
everything. Neither happens in this experiment but an increase in contributions (on average from 27% 
to 40%) does occur with the increase in MPCR. These puzzling data will be discussed in more detail in 
Section 4 below. 
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We can also get some indirect evidence on the effect of marginal payoffs from two 
other sources; experiments with asymmetric payoffs and experiments with rebates . An 
example of the former can be found in Section 2.4 where Isaac, McCue, and Plott (1985) 
found (conclusion 7 p. 64) that "individuals in the high payoff condition contribute more 
than individuals in the low payoff condition." Marwell and Ames (1979) also report more 
contributions from "high interest" (blue) subjects (see Figure 6 Section 2.3 for the payoffs) 
than "low interest" (green) subjects. Other confirming evidence with asymmetric payoffs 
can be found in Brookshire, Coursey, and Redington (1989a) , Fisher, Isaac, Schatzberg, 
and Walker (1988) , Palfrey and Rosenthal ( 1991a) ,  and Rapoport and Suleiman (1993) .  
One of the more powerful sets of supporting data i s  in Palfrey and Prisbrey (1993) who 
mimic the Isaac and Walker framework but allow the private value to be asymmetric 
across subjects. In particular ui = Pi(z - ci) + a  L:: Ci where Pi is private information, 
drawn randomly and uniformly from the set { 1 ,  2, . . .  , 20} .  Here it is a dominant strategy 
to contribute if Pi < a  and to not contribute if Pi > a .  They used a total of 64 subjects 
in four different experimental sessions involving 4 person groups. A very simple probit 
model, Probability( contribute)= £(constant + a(� ) )  is able to correctly predict 83% of 
the observations. 79 
Clearly, the marginal payoff ii: is an important effect.80 This is true whether thresholds p 
are present or not. Indeed one other source of confirming data comes from the analysis of 
rebates in threshold situations. Dawes, Orbell, Simmons, and van de Kragt (1986) study 
two changes in their simple payoff structure, both of which increase the marginal payoff 
to contributing ceteris pa1·ibus. In their baseline condition each subject could contribute 
or keep $5. If at least J( of N contribute, then all get $10.  In a "no fear" condition 
all contributors get their $5 back if less than f{ contribute. In a "no greed" condition 
subjects who do not contribute only get $5 more if at least J{ contribute. The data are 
in Table 14. In another study with thresholds Isaac, Schmidtz, and Walker (1988) also 
find a significant effect for rebates . 
Table 14. % Contributing 
K=3 of 7 K=5 of 7 
baseline 51% 64% 
no fear 61% 65% 
no greed 86% 93% 
The only report which might cast any doubts on the strong effect of increasing 
marginal payoffs can be found in Isaac, Walker, and Williams ( 1990) .  Here they be­
gin to explore the effect of large numbers (N=40 and 100) without the deception which 
79The t statistic on the estimated coefficient a is 86.358. 
8°For additional work see Carter et al. (1992) . 
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characterized others ' earlier attempts. They found, with these large numbers, that vary­
ing MPCR between . 3  and .75 had no significant effect on percentage contributions. In 
fact , it was not until MPCR dropped from .3 to .03 that any significant decline in contri­
butions occurred. Either increasing numbers has a dampening second order effect on the 
effect of marginal payoffs or there was something else in their experimental design which 
caused the effect to be eliminated. Let us see what we can find out about numbers . 
3 . 3 . 2  Numbers 
The second variable that is most easy to control is the number of subjects. One of the 
longest running debates among theorists , other than whether contributions will occur at 
all, is whether contributions increase or decrease with group size.81 Those arguing for a 
decrease in Eti as N increases generally believe that, in larger groups, non-cooperative 
behavior is more difficult to detect and, therefore, self-interested subjects will be more 
willing not to contribute. The argument that an increase in Eti will occur as N increases 
usually relies on the fact that the marginal effect on Ei ui with respect to ti increases 
as N increases and, therefore, any tendency toward altruism should be reinforced as N 
increases. In the Isaac and Walker environments ui = Pi (Zi - ci) +  l{ (Ej Cj ) ·  The marginal 
(selfish) incentive to contribute is pfl = M PC R. The marginal (selfish) incentive not to 
contribute is p�N .  The group benefit if Pi = p for all i is E ui = p(E Zi - E Ci) + a (Ej Cj ) ,  
so the marginal (altruistic) incentive to cooperate i s  � .  If we keep a and p constant but 
increase group size, we increase the marginal sdfish incentive not to contribute relative 
to the marginal altruistic incentive to contribute; causing contributions to decrease with 
N. If we keep l{ and p constant and increase N, we cause the marginal altruistic incentive 
to contribute to increase relative to the marginal selfish incentive not to contribute and 
cause contributions to increase. Does that happen? What do the data say? 
While there are many experiments with different numbers , and different MPCRs ,  
there are only a small number which systematically vary N as one of the treatments .  
Of those, only Isaac and Walker's group recognized the intimate relationship between 
MPCR and N. Three studies by Marwell and Ames (1979) , Chamberlin (1978) ,  and 
Bagnoli and McKee (1991)  involved provision points. Marwell and Ames (1979) ,  see 
Section 2.3 ,  found no effect from varying numbers. They did, however, adjust payoffs 
between large and small groups . 
. . . keeping the situations of subjects in large and small groups otherwise 
comparable also required keeping mean interest (Vi ) and resources constant 
over groups. This meant that for large groups the total resources and interest 
had to be 20 times as large as in small groups. For this reason cutting points 
810lson (1971) is usually cited as arguing for the decrease. Chamberlin ( 1974) provides conditions 
under which there might be an increase. 
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for changes in payoffs were also kept proportionate, so that, for example, 20 
times as many tokens had to be invested by the large group before the payoffs 
became larger than one cent per token. Thus, the mean contributions were 
required to be identical for identical effects. (Marwell and Ames (1979) , p .  
1346 . )  
I think this means that � was held constant as N increased but I cannot really tell 
from their description. Chamberlin (1978) found a negative effect on contributions as N 
increased. Bagnoli and McKee (1991) also found a negative effect particularly in early 
periods. They conjecture "individuals in a larger group may find it more difficult to focus 
on a particular equilibrium vector of contributions.82 
I find the Isaac-Walker experiments without thresholds most revealing because they 
attempt to control for the purely private incentives (measured by MPCR) in order to 
isolate the effect of numbers and they have tried large numbers without deception. Ini­
tially they used groups of 4 and 10 and MPCRs of .3 and . 75 . Those data were displayed 
in Section 2.4, Table 8. They found that MPCR mattered and N did not. The only way 
N mattered was if a were held constant causing a crowding effect where M PC R = P� 
declines as N increases. Believing they had discovered a systemic relation between con­
tribution and numbers, they then designed with Williams an experiment for N =40 and 
N =100. In doing so they had to overcome several methodological difficulties. To avoid 
the extremely high cost of such experiments, they developed a new method for rewarding 
their subjects. In their own words: 
As explained in the class handout , subject i 's experimental dollar earnings 
were converted into the following "performance index" prior to being con­
verted into extra-credit points: 
i ' s  Actual Earnings - i 's Minimum Possible Earnings 
i 's Maximum Possible Earnings - i 's Minimum Possible Earnings 
which can range from 0 to 1 for each individual. At the end of the final 
round, this fraction was computed for each individual (based on earnings in all 
rounds) ,  multiplied by 3 ,  and added to the subject 's final grade average. Thus , 
the range of possible extra-credit points was [O , 3] . The performance index was 
used so that the maximum and minimum possible extra-credit earnings did 
not depend upon the design cell assignment. All classes from which subjects 
were drawn utilized a 100-point scale and, with minor modifications, used a 
standard mapping of point totals into letter grades (A=90's, B=SO's, etc. ) .  
820ne other interesting set of experiments with Cournot oligopoly, reported in Morrison a.nd Ka.ma.rei 
( 1990) ,  finds no effect from numbers. As with thresholds there is an interior equilibrium but unlike with 
thresholds it is unique. 
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Furthermore, Indiana University allows + and - letter grades, so a umque 
letter grade typically comprised a 3 to 4 point interval. 
We have spent a great deal of time considering questions of practicability 
and fairness in the use of extra-credit points as a motivator. On the issue of 
fairness, we can report that of the hundreds of subjects who participated in 
the VCM-MS-XC experiments ,83 we do not know of a single grade appeal in 
which these extra credit points were an issue. (Isaac, Walker, and Williams 
( 1990) pp. 6-7.84) 
A second methodological innovation for N =40 and 100 involved a technique which 
allowed subjects to make decisions when not all 100 were in the same room at the same 
time. In particular, each decision-making round lasted several days, rather than a few 
minutes , so students could access the experiment on a network and make their decisions. 
This contrasts with the typical single session which usually lasts only an hour or two. As 
they note on p .  6 :  
The experimental procedures outlined above represent a logical link between 
standard single-session laboratory experiments and actual field experiments .  
Certainly some experimental control is lost relative to a strictly controlled 
laboratory setting, however, the gain in feasible group sizes, the real time 
between allocation decisions, and the more "natural" communication oppor­
tunities available in this environment add an element of parallelism with non­
experimental settings that could have important methodological and behav­
ioral ramifications. (Isaac, Walker, and Williams ( 1990) p .6 . )  
Both innovations are clever and important advances in the methodology of experimen­
tal economics, and if their innovations are valid, Isaac, Walker, and Willia.ms have found 
a very inexpensive way to do experimental economics. They did run control sessions 
in order to check validity. In a comparison to their earlier results with cash payments 
they claim "For a specific group size and MPCR, the aggregate pattern of token alloca­
tions . . .  are very similar ." A significant difference (through a t-test) in the percentage of 
tokens contributed is found in only one round. 
Contrary to most economists ' expectations ,  not only were contributions higher with 
large N but the effect of MPCR was significantly diluted. In particular they make three 
observations based on their data with large N. (Isaac et al. p . 13 . )  
83My footnote: VCM-MS-XC means "voluntary contribution mechanism-multiple session-extra 
credit ." 
841 would like to thank R.M. Isaac for permission to quote from this report. 
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First, the impact from variations in the magnitude of the marginal per­
capita return from the public good (MPCR) appears to vanish over the range 
[0 .30, 0 .75) . Second, with an MPCR of .30, groups of size 40 and 100 provide 
the public good at higher levels of efficiency than groups of size 4 and 10 .  
Third, with an MPCR of . 75 ,  there is no significant difference in efficiency 
due to group size. (Isaac, Walker, and Williams (1990) p . 13 . ) 
Finally, in an attempt to rescue the "MPCR effect" they ran three single session 
40 person experiments with money (at a cost of about $900 each) and an MPCR=.3 .  
They found no deterioration in contributions but , in  fact , a slight increase over the "no 
money" experiments .  Continuing their rescue attempt they ran 4 experimental sessions 
with N=40 but MPCR=.03, three with credit points and multiple sessions and one with 
money and a single session. Here they finally found contribution rates that looked more 
like the N=4, MPCR=.3 experiments. Instead of using large numbers to hide one's 
selfishness ,  subjects actually seem to become more cooperative in the larger groups .  
This would be  consistent with the existence of the selfish vs. altruistic tradeoff described 
earlier where holding ;JP constant and increasing N increases contributions. But another 
possible implication of all this is that voluntary contributions experiments with public 
goods, as many do them, are yielding data which are not very sensitive to the incentives 
provided by the experimentalists. 
What do we now know and what do we need to find out? Clearly, subjects appear 
to respond positively to increases in their MPCR although the effect is diluted in large 
groups .  To really pin down the relationship between contributions, MPCR, and N will 
cost a lot of money and effort since we need to fill in data between N =10, 40, and 100. 
We also need observations for more values of MPCR than just . 03 ,  .3 ,  and . 75. There 
are many other observations on various pairs of MPCR and N in the literature but they 
need to be extracted and tabulated.85 This would be, to me, a very interesting subject 
for a dissertation. 
Also, can we now conclude altruism is at work? Rather than running a very large 
number of experiments ,  one could try to leap to an understanding by creating a new 
theory which explains or predicts a relationship (Litif N) = J[M PC R, N, a] where Liti 
are total contributions, N =number of subjects, and a are, perhaps uncontrolled and 
unobserved, parameters .  The development of such a theory would also point to new 
experiments which might require new . .  theory, and so forth. Let us see how this might 
work. 
Standard game theory predicts ,  for the Isaac-Walker environment that 
(Liti) /N = 0 = f(M, N, a) 
850ne of the problems a theorist faces in trying to decide what we know is the fact that many 
experimentalists make very little effort to relate their results to others. 
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for all M < 1 where M = MPCR = v1Jv· Try as they might, however, experimental 
economists have been unable to support that theory in the lab .  Based on their own ex­
periments ,  Isaac-Walker-Williams suggest86 a theory based on the concept of a successful 
group effort .  The idea is that those who contribute are happy to do so if at least those 
who do are better off than at the initial endowment . This will be true if and only if 
[ (Eti ) /N]a > p. This means there is a minimally sized successful group S = MJ,CR so 
that if at least S contribute then those who do are satisfied. This effectively creates a 
threshold payoff in utility as opposed to dollars. Keeping MPCR fixed as N grows, S 
becomes a smaller percentage and, presumably, more likely to occur so agents are more 
likely to risk contributing. One can formalize this and generate an equation for the 
expected % contribution 
E[(Eti )/N] = II[pZ, MPCR, N] 
where the form of II depends on the, unknown and uncontrolled, distribution of the 
subjects '  tastes for success .  But II(· )  is estimable from enough data. It can be shown 
that fJII/8M > 0, 8II/ap < 0, and 8II/8z < 0, independently of that distribution. One 
other implication is that if payoffs are increased, that is if u = -A[p(z - t) + �Et] where 
A > 1 ,  then (since this does not change the MPCR but does increase pz) we should see 
contributions decline. All implications are testable in the lab. 
Another theory, based on the idea that subjects trade off selfish payments against 
altruism would suggest a personal utility payoff of Vi[·ui , Euk] where ui is paid to i and 
Euk is the total paid to all subjects. Approximating Vi linearly yields ui + f3Ekuk. For 
the Isaac-Walker environment 
Thus, i will contribute if and only if (3 � JM-�1 •  For this theory, the distribution of (3 is 
uncontrolled and unobservable, but the predictions are that87 
[ 1 - M ] . 
E [(Eti)/N] = / NM _ l 
where /I < 0. Thus 81/8N > 0 ,  81/8pz = 0, and 81/8M > 0 .  As opposed to the 
model based on minimally sized successful groups ,  this model predicts no change in % 
contribution if payoffs .are. increased since .M. will -not . change. 
86They have since provided some detail based on expectations about the effects of signaling. Their 
model predicts that contributions will decrease with [ 1:MM · N:_1 ) and will not change with a multiplicative 
increase in payoffs. 
871 is 1 
- F(·) where F is the population cumulative distribution function of (3, a sample of which 
appears in the lab. Under the maintained hypothesis that the theory is correct , 'Y can be estimated from 
the data. 
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A third theory, based on the idea that subjects care about fairness or equality, would 
have vi = ui + 8 Jr (Ej(Uj - u)2] where u = Jr Ej ui , and 8 < o. When ui = p(z - ti) + 
.!!:.. � . t ·  then N L.,,3 J 
where t = Jr Ej tj . Differentiate Vi with respect to ti , set it equal to zero and get 
or 
_ N(l - M) ti = t + 8 . 2 p 
The expected % contribution is therefore 
E[%C] = E (E ti) = Ei 1J + N(M - 1) E (- 1) 
N N 2p 8 
where ti is j 's belief about others expected contributions.ss Therefore 
E(%C) = a [E(t) , N(� - l) E ( ;; ) l 
where aa I 8p > 0 and 8a I 8N < 0 since kl < 1 .  If payoffs are increased then E(%C) 
decreases since N, M stay constant but p increases . 
We now have three theories based on three different uncontrollable and unobservable 
parameters . Each is consistent with the finding that increases in M increase contribu­
tions. Each yields different predictions for the comparative statics of N, P,  and z and 
they can, therefore in principle, be separated in the lab even if full control is not possible. 
At least two should be demonstrably incorrect based on data. Maybe the third is also.s9 
The next round belongs to the experimentalists. 
88Since M < 1 ,  ti < ti so, strictly speaking, t; = 0 if ti + N(::.- l) :S 0. Thus E(%C) is an overestimate 
of the correct number. This does not affect the comparativ% statics below. Also it does provide a 
somewhat ad hoc explanation for a decline in contributions with repetition since if subjects use last 
periods contributions to estimate this periods ti then contributions will follow the time path given by 
(N(M - 1)) %Cr = %Cr-1  + k 
p 
where k is a subject pool specific constant. 
89Since none predicts splitting of tokens, a well-known fact, all are technically deficient. See Chen 
(1993) for a theory which might explain splitting. 
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3.3.3 Communication 
In Section 2.2 we saw that Dawes, McTavish, and Shaklee (1977) were able to demonstrate 
that relevant communication increased contributions in N-person dilemma experiments. 
This seems to be a consistent, replicable, and strong finding, especially for environments 
without thresholds . What does theory say? As it turns out , not much. Preplay com­
munication, however structured, in the language of modern game theory is simply cheap 
talk. If there is a unique dominant strategy equilibrium, as is true of most experiments 
without thresholds, then talking should have no effect on rates of contribution: We should 
see none. If there are multiple Nash equilibria as is often the case with thresholds, cheap 
talk generally expands the number of equilibria but might lead to better coordination by 
subjects .  This might raise the efficiency of the voluntary contributions mechanisms. 
What do the data say? Let us look first at non-threshold environments .  At least nine 
papers report an obvious and significant increase in group payoffs when communication 
is allowed prior to play. Dawes, McTavish, and Shaklee (1977) report an increase in 
payoffs from 31 % to 72% when relevant communication occurs. (See Table 3 in Section 
2.2 . )  Isaac, McCue, and Plott (1985) report90 that "communication increases the level 
of contribution (and efficiencies) . The increase is small but it appears to be stable." (p.  
67.) Isaac a.nd Walker (1988a) report91 "our results document the significant impact of 
group communication in the reduction of free riding behavior." Their four groups average 
greater than 80% contributions. In a follow-up study Isaac and Walker (1991 ) designed 
an experiment to make communication costly. In fact it was made a threshold public 
good.92 In spite of the cost of communication the groups still achieved an efficiency level 
higher than 91  % in six of ten periods. 
One interesting aspect of these results is that repetition seems to increase the rate 
of contribution with communication rather than inhibit it. The Dawes et al. results 
are for one-shot decisions and yield 70% levels while the Isaac-Walker results are for 
10  or more periods and yield 90%. There are of course other differences in their ex­
periments so the comparison is somewhat tenuous. But Sell and Wilson (1990) have 
tested this comparison directly. Groups of 6 subjects with 40 tokens each contributed 
to an Isaac-Walker type public good with MPCR=.3 under a 2 x 2 treatment design. 
What was varied was (a) whether subjects were told what others did in past decisions 
or not and (b) whether subjects could announce whether they intended to contribute 
or not in the next decision. The idea is that no information-no announcement is like 
a one-shot experiment, information-no announcement is like the Isaac-Walker-Thomas 
experiments without communication a.nd information-announcement is like Isaac-Walker 
with very limited communication. The results are given in Table 15 .  I am not sure 
what to make of this. Communication without verification (announcement only) seems 
90See Section 2.4 for a description of their experimental design. 
91Their environment is described in Section 2 .4. Here they used an MPCR of .3 .  
92If at  least 4 of 6 contributed 10¢, all could talk. There were no rebates. 
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Table 15 .  Duncan's Multiple Range Test for Contributions 
Treatment Mean N Duncan Grouping 
No Information, No Announcement 60.3 72 A 
Information, Announcement 59.3 72 A 
Information Only 46.0 72 B 
Announcement Only 34.0 72 C 
Note: Means with the same letter are not significantly different .at .05 
Sell and Wilson ( 1990) p .23 .  (I would like to thank J. Sell for permission 
to quote from this report. )  
to reduce contributions. With verification it helps (59.3% vs. 46 .0%) .  But no informa­
tion or communication, the one-shot equivalent, yields the same rate of contribution as 
information and communication, the repetition and communication equivalent. Sell and 
Wilson state: 
Our results are consistent with other reported results using a voluntary contri­
bution mechanism. Everywhere we observe a consistent decay in provisioning 
that extends over the periods . . .  Where individuals are able to make an­
nouncements and check on one another's behavior, they are somewhat less 
likely to lie in their announcements (the Pearson's correlation coefficient be­
tween one's announcement and contribution is .34, compared with . 1 0  under 
the Announcement Only condition) .  
But they also admit that they are "far from capturing the essence of communication." 
Dawes and Orbell have been systematically studying communication in dilemmas, 
trying to identify that essence. Experiments without thresholds are reported in Dawes, 
van de Kragt, and Orbell (1987) , Orbell, van de Kragt, and Dawes (1988) ,  and Orbell, 
Dawes, and van de Kragt (1990) . Their present position seems to be that communication 
"works either because it provides an occasion for (multilateral) promises or because it 
generates group identity - or, possibly some combination of those two hypotheses ." (Or­
bell, Dawes, and van de Kragt (1990) p.619, footnote 7 . )  They also note that multilateral 
promising only goes so far. , In their words 
Perhaps the psychology of multilateral promising reduces to the psychology 
of a set of bilateral promises - perhaps, that is, people in our experiment felt 
they were making promises, as Hobbes put it, "every one apart, and Man by 
Man." But the straightforward interpretation of our data is that people do 
revert to what we have called multilateral promising and that , when they do, 
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it can work. As this article has suggested, the interesting problem is that when 
people do revert to multilateral promising, there is no fully satisfactory rule 
for specifying when one's announced willingness to accept the proposed terms 
of multilateral exchange becomes an ethical obligation actually to do so. Our 
data are consistent with their adopting in practice a rule saying that promises 
are not ethically binding until everyone in the group has promised. This rule 
is as simple a.s the analogous rule that works nicely in the bilateral case and 
is attractive to that extent. But the conditions under which it can produce 
satisfactory multilateral exchanges are quite restrictive. It only requires a 
single individual to withhold a promise for whatever reason, and the effort at 
multilateral promising collapses . We note that , for many N-person prisoner's 
dilemma configurations , losses from such a failure could be quite substantial. 
Short of further empirical investigation, we do not know whether the unanim­
ity requirement is progressively relaxed a.s size increases so that some propor­
tion or number less than everyone promising is sufficient to trigger ethical 
obligation. It is ,  nevertheless ,  instructive that , among our relatively small 
fourteen-person groups, only about half managed to meet the obligation­
invoking unanimity criterion - and to capture the benefits that came with 
that . (Orbell, Dawes, and van de Kragt (1990) p.627.93 ) 
We see that communication increases contributions in no-threshold environments with 
small (N < 15) groups. We do not know why. We also do not know what would happen 
in large groups. 
For completeness we should consider environments with thresholds. Here the evidence 
is mixed although the theory suggests there should be even more group gains from com­
munication than in the dilemma environment. van de Kragt , Orbell, and Dawes (1983) 
report communication increases efficiency and contribution while Chamberlin (1978) and 
Palfrey and Rosenthal (1991b) report no discernible effect. This needs more study. 
3 . 4  Weak Effects 
In this section I will briefly identify and describe a variety of additional phenomena 
which experimentalists have pointed to as possible explanations for behavior observed 
in voluntary contributions games. I separate these into environmental, systemic, and 
institutional effects as was done in Table 10. Each effect has some evidence supporting 
its importance, but I have called these weak effects because there does not yet appear to 
me to be enough evidence for acceptance. In many cases there is apparently conflicting 
evidence. Future research will determine whether any one of these effects should be 
included among those in Section 3 .3 . 
931 would like to thank the University of Chicago Press for permission to quote from this report .  
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3.4.1  Environment 
Homogeneity and Information In many of the early experiments with voluntary 
contributions, all subjects were given the same preferences and endowments .94 There is 
now reason to believe that such homogeneity in the environment has a positive effect 
on contributions. Isaac, McCue, and Plott ( 1985) conjectured this in their attempt to 
reduce contributions, and included asymmetries in payoffs. But they did not control for 
the effect by also studying their environment without asymmetries. 
We have already seen that contribution rates are responsive to marginal payoffs. 
See Section 3 .2 .  What is at issue here is whether there is an additional effect due to 
heterogeneity in payoffs or endowments. For example, suppose if everyone is the same, 
contributions are 60% with MPCR=. 75 and 30% with MPCR=.3 .  Now suppose we have 
an environment with half MPCR's=. 75 and half=.3. Is the aggregate contribution rate 
45%? Or are the contribution rates of the high MPCR types now less than 60% since 
they can safely mimic the behavior of the low MPCR types? Theory is no help since it 
predicts contributions of 0 no matter what. What do the data sa.y? 
In Table 16, I provide a summary of five papers which compare ceteris paribus contri­
butions in homogeneous environments to contributions in heterogeneous environments. 
Looking only at the last column would lead one to conclude that heterogeneity lowers 
contributions. But the effect can clearly be dampened by a lack of information and/or a 
lack of repetition (or repetition without reports of previous outcomes) .  Can we separate 
these effects? Let us look at the role and impact of alternative information structures. 
Table 16. 
Threshold Repetition Completec More Heterogeneity 
Information Implies % Contribution 
Bagnoli and McKee (1991) y y y decrease 
Brookshire et al. ( 1989a) N y Y and N decrease 
Fisher et al. ( 1988) N y Na decrease in 
first 10 periods 
Marwell and Ames ( 1979, 1980) y N N no effect 
Rapoport and Suleiman (1993) y yb y decrease only 
at high threshold 
a Subjects were told values "might not be the same" and all values were changed at 
period 10.  
b 
c 
Repetition occurred but no information about previous contributions of others was 
provided. 
Complete information means subjects know the ex ante distribution of possible types . 
94This is true of Dawes, McTavish , and Shaklee (1977) , Isaac, Walker, and Thomas ( 1984) , and some 
of Marwell and Ames (1979) . 
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An important environmental treatment which can be controlled by the experimentalist 
is what subjects know about the environment and about the actions of others . As early 
as Fouraker and Siegel (1963) it was recognized by experimentalists that this information 
structure was important . Even the usually predictable behavior of subjects in Double 
Oral Auction Markets becomes more volatile and less responsive to the Law of Supply 
and Demand if subjects know each other's payoffs. See Smith and Williams (1990) .  
Unfortunately, however, there have been only two studies of this easily controlled effect. 
Brookshire et al. ( 1989a) provide two information structures ...,., one: (called incomplete) 
in which each subject knows only her own payoff and endowment and another (called 
complete95) in which each subject knows the list of others' payoffs and endowments but 
do not know who has which one. They check 5 different payoff structures and find 
that contributions tend to be less under complete information than under incomplete 
information in all environments except the one, in which all subjects were identical. In 
that homogeneous case information had no effect. Isaac and Walker (1989) studied only 
the homogeneous case and found no effect on contributions from changing the information 
conditions. So the studies are consistent but hardly conclusive and it is not easy to find 
other experimental evidence to provide support. For example, although the evidence from 
experiments with asymmetric payoffs and common knowledge of the possible types that 
Palfrey and Rosenthal ( 1991b) and Palfrey and Prisbrey (1993) conducted suggest lower 
contributions than those of Dawes, McTavish, and Shaklee (1977) and Isaac, Walker, and 
Thomas (1984) ,  it is only a suggestion and not a controlled experiment. We can make 
several tentative conjectures but nonetheless they need considerably more testing before 
they become "stylized facts" .96 First, heterogeneity lowers the rate of contribution -
unless there is incomplete information and no repetition. Second, complete information 
leads to less contribution than with incomplete information - unless there is homogeneity. 
The existence of a threshold does not seem to play an interactive role with heterogeneity. 
See Chan et al. ( 1993) for additional work with heterogeneous endowments. 
Gender One of the most obvious but easiest to control97 aspects of the environment 
is gender. The question is simple: does gender affect the rate of contribution and how? 
There are 5 relevant studies but the evidence is nevertheless still inconclusive. On the 
one side, there are two studies which purport to find that females tend to contribute 
more than males. Dawes, McTavish, and Shaklee (1977) find this in one experiment but 
are quick to point out that it occurred only in the relevant communication condition and 
that (see their -footnote 5 p. lO) "we "have never been able to replicate the sex effect ." 
Mason, Phillips, and Redington (1991) find, for two person games , that "at the beginning 
95In the language of modern game theory, the distribution of types is common knowledge. Information 
is complete but imperfect. 
96For example Brookshire et al. (1989a) suggest that the effect of heterogeneity depends on the range 
of alternative types - how many and how different. This needs more exploration. 
97This is still not perfectly controlled always. See, for example, footnote 42 in Section 2.3 for a problem 
encountered by Marwell and Ames. 
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of experiments women tend to be more cooperative than men and have a higher variance 
of choices."  But they also note that "after 25 periods these differences vanish." In 
the middle, finding no effect , are Isaac, McCue, and Plott ( 1985) , Poppe and Utens 
(1986) ,  and Orbell, Schwartz-Shea, Dawes, and Elvin (1992) . On the other side, there 
is the only experiment designed specifically to isolate and identify a gender effect in a 
public goods experiment with more than two players .  Brown-Kruse and Hummels (1992) 
used an Isaac-Walker design with N=4 and MPCR's of .3 and .5. They also varied 
a condition they called "community" , a group identity phenomena discussed further in 
Section 3.4 .2. They found first that there were no significant differences in the way that 
men and women responded to the community or multiplier (MPCR) treatments ,  nor in 
the way they contributed by period. But they also found significant gender differences 
in contribution rates. " . . .  males contributed at higher rates than did women" (p. 12) .  
Men's initial contributions rates are higher but their comparative statics are the same. 
So are there gender differences? I think the question remains open.98 
3.4.2 Systemic 
In this section we consider three explanatory variables that may be important determi­
nants of cooperative behavior but which are difficult to measure and control. 
Economics Training In Marwell and Ames (1981) a tongue-in-cheek, but still provoca­
tive, question was raised: are economists the only free riders? They reported finding that 
contributions were significantly lower if and only if the subjects were graduate students 
in economics at Wisconsin. Isaac, McCue, and Plott (1985) took exception to this and 
used students in an undergraduate sociology course at Pasadena City College and stu­
dents from undergraduate economics courses at Caltech. They found, under repetition, 
that "the tendency for erosion of contributions is not unique to societies populated by 
economists . . .  Our single experiment with sociology subjects yielded substantially the 
same results as other subject pools, including economists. "  I find neither set of data 
particularly convincing. It is not obvious what is being measured by participation in a 
class: Experience, training, self-selection, or propensity to contribute? Are high school, 
2-year college, 4-year college, and graduate classes different? Is the effect large enough 
(if it exists at all) to be found across a large number of very sensitive environments? The 
effect of training. and/or self-selection on- cooperation remains a wide-open problem.99 
98Robyn Dawes has suggested to me that a "wild speculation would be that men cooperate more when 
the experimenter is female" and vice versa. This can be tested. 
99In research on ultimatum games, a 2-person situation, Carter and Irons (1991) find that economists 
are more selfish. Frank, Gilovich, and Regan (1993) have a similar finding for 2-person prisoner dilemmas. 
Kagel , Kim, and Moser (1992) do not support the Carter and Irons result .  I know of no other work 
specifically designed to isolate an "economist" effect than these three, but see Schram and Sonnemans 
(1992) for additional work in this area. 
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Beliefs It is not surprising that some researchers have tried to explain contributions, 
when not contributing is a dominant strategy, as mistakes. One systematic way to do this 
is by assuming subjects arrive in the lab with beliefs about the world, that these beliefs 
affect their behavior, and that these are not controlled in the experiments. Indeed not 
only are they not controlled they may be only indirectly measurable. Three approaches 
have been taken: two with thresholds, one without. Let us look at the threshold en­
vironments first. Rapoport ( 1985) introduced the notion of strategic uncertainty or a 
subject 's probability belief that the sum of contributions of other players is less than or 
equal to X, call it Fj(X) . So when j 's payoff is 
{ r + z · - t · if "" t  · > T J J L..J i _  
Zj - ij if L: ti < T 
and j maximizes expected payoff, j will choose ij to 
or 
max r[l - Fj (T - ij)] + Zj - ij .  
From a theorist's point of view this is very straightforward. From an experimental­
ist's point of view the problem is that the subject brings the function Fj( - )  to the lab. 
Suleiman and Rapoport try to discover what Fj is by asking questions of the subjects. No 
payments were made contingent on their answers. 100 Using the estimated Fj Suleiman 
and Rapoport can predict tj from the maximization problem and then compare it to the 
actual contributions. Although this approach seems to have some explanatory power,101 
in their most recent paper Rapoport and Suleiman, ( 1993) ,  conclude "although we have 
achieved limited success in accounting for the contribution decisions of some of the sub­
jects ,  our results show that neither the cooperative nor the expected utility model account 
for the behavior of the majority of the subjects." (p.30) .  I would suggest that perhaps 
the (survey) data on beliefs and risk attitudes are unreliable and that before one rejects 
those models one should try to find better ways to measure what is needed. Perhaps 
some of the techniques discussed in chapter Camerer (1994) would be of help. 
An alternative approach is devised by Palfrey and Rosenthal (199la) who consider 
misspecified priors and in a more complete game-theoretic framework. This allows a 
much clearer test of the expected utility approach using only the actual decisions of the 
100This yields a rather peculiar juxtaposition of strong control of payoffs and absolutely no control over 
the data on beliefs. 
101The interested reader can check the data analysis in Suleiman and Rapoport ( 1992) and Rapoport 
and Suleiman ( 1993) . They also generalize the model above by assuming subjects have expected utility 
functions of the form u( x) = kxc. They estimate c by fitting kxc to nine responses of each subject about 
two alternative gambles and their certainty equivalents. No payments were contingent on the responses 
so one must be careful about the quality of these data. 
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subjects (for which they were paid) .  By changing the experiment so that ( 1 )  contributions 
are all or none and (2) the public good is provided if at least I< of N contribute, it is 
easy to show that a subject contributes if and only if rP{-1 � zi where P{-1 is j 's 
belief (probability) that exactly I< - 1 others will contribute. If zi is randomly chosen 
from a cdf G(· )  then at a Bayes Equilibrium102 each expected payoff maximizing subject 
contributes if and only if Zi :::; z* , the probability any one subject contributes is G(z*) ,  
and z* satisfies 
�z* = ( N - 1 ) G(z*)K-1 ( 1  - G(z* ) )N-I< . 
r k - 1  
Palfrey and Rosenthal carefully induce the payoffs and G. In their words: 
At the beginning of each experiment, subjects were told K, N, r in "francs," 
. . .  and all other relevant information about the experimental procedures. 
They were also told how many cents per franc they would receive at the 
conclusion of the session. These values were held constant throughout an ex­
periment. Subjects earned between $10 and $20 during each session. Sessions 
lasted between forty-five minutes and an hour and a half. 
In each round, subjects were each given a single indivisible "token" (endow­
ment ) .  Token values in franc increments between 1 and either 90 or 204 were 
independently drawn with replacement from identical uniform distributions 
and randomly assigned to subjects, and this was carefully explained to the 
subjects in the instructions . . . .  Then each subject was told the value of his 
or her token, but not told the values of the tokens of other subjects. Subjects 
were then asked to enter their decisions (spend or not spend the token) . 
The results were very striking. First using the predicted z*(I<, N) and varying I< 
and N, (N=3 and 4,  J{ =1,2, and 3) , one can get a prediction of subjects earnings in the 
Bayes equilibrium. The regression of predicted on actual yields 
actual earnings=- .054+1 .045z* predicted with n=33 and R2= .95. 
The intercept is not statistically different from 0 and the slope is not different from 1. But 
individual behavior differs · substantially from· that predicted by the model: contribute 
when zi ::=; z*(K, N) . Palfrey and Rosenthal consider four alternative models: biased 
probabilities , risk aversion, other non-linear utility forms including altruism and the 
Rapoport model, and cooperation. They show that these yield different predictions 
about how contributions change with f{ and N. They then proceed to show that the 
data support only the hypothesis that subjects' priors about G(z* (K, N) ) are biased 
102See Palfrey and Rosenthal (199la) for the details. 
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upward - that is subjects expect a slightly higher rate of contribution than is consistent 
with an unbiased Bayes-Nash equilibrium. Whether this methodological approach would 
yield similar results for the complete information world of Dawes, Orbell, Simmons, and 
van de Kragt ( 1986) remains an open question. 
It is important to recognize the methodological differences between Rapoport and 
Palfrey and Rosenthal. The latter use a standard economic approach to data analysis 
computing comparative statics predictions from theory and then comparing those pre­
dictions to the data using standard hypothesis tests .  In many cases this circumvents the 
need to measure utility functions and/or priors directly because the indirect predictions 
are independent of the precise details of those functions. Survey data103 in an experi­
mental context are unreliable so it is important to find ways to avoid their use. Indeed, 
that is the purpose of the lab. Theory, comparative statics , and statistical procedures 
can allow us to test and identify, using indirect evidence, the existence of effects which 
are otherwise unmeasurable and, perhaps, uncontrollable. 
Beliefs have also been used as an explanation for contributions in experiments without 
thresholds. The data can be found as early as Dawes, McTavish, and Shaklee (1977) ; a 
theory for two-person dilemmas can be found in Orbell and Dawes104 ( 1991) .  In their N 
person dilemma experiments ,  described earlier in Section 2.2, they also asked subjects 
about their expectations of others '  behavior. They report that 
One of our most consistent findings throughout these studies - a finding repli­
cated by others' work - is that cooperators expect significantly more coop­
eration than do defectors. This result has been found both when payoffs are 
"step-level" (when contributions from a subset of k subjects ensure provision 
of a benefit to all) and when they are "symmetric" (when all contributions 
ensure a constant benefit to all) . (Orbell and Dawes (1991)  p.518 .105) 
The data on beliefs are the results of surveys but there does seem to be something 
systematic; subjects with a propensity to cooperate (for whatever reason) also tend to 
believe others are more likely to cooperate. Dawes, McTavish and Shaklee (1977) go 
farther and claim that it is choice causing beliefs and not vice versa.106 In Orbell and 
1031 use this term to identify data collected by asking subjects questions for which there is nothing at 
stake. This includes standard debriefing such as "What were you doing?" As a classroom exercise, l 
have often asked students to describe their strategy after an experiment . In the overwhelming majority 
of cases the data generated in that experiment reject the subjects' own hypotheses about their own 
behavior. l now tend to ignore any ex post anecdotal evidence from surveys. 
104A critique and response can be found in McLean, Orbell , and Dawes (1991) .  
1051 would like to thank the American Political Science Association for permission to quote from this 
report. 
106They survey both subjects who were decision makers and subjects who were (unseen) observers .  
The variance of responses of the former was larger suggesting that choice affected beliefs. 
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Dawes ( 1991) they use this as one assumption in a model which purports to explain the 
evolution of cooperation and, presumably therefore, the tendency to cooperate in the 
one-shot experiments .  I think these ideas deserve to be explored further especially in a 
way that provides more reliability in the responses to questions about beliefs . Scoring 
rules or payments to the subject whose predicted percentage cooperation is closest to 
the actual percentage might tighten up the data. It would also be interesting to see how 
repetition affects predictions and how prediction affects behavior.107 
Friends, Group Solidarity Two experimentalists have tried to discover whether some 
form of group identity might cause contributions to increase. Both have indicated the 
answer is yes . Orbell, van de Kragt, and Dawes (1988) report the results of an experiment 
similar to the Dawes, McTavish, and Shaklee (1977) experiments described in Section 
2.2 .  One difference was that some groups were told their contributions would provide 
a public good, not for those in their own room, but for a similar group in another 
room. Although the payoff structure is identical in both treatments, cooperation is 
significantly higher (almost twice as high) when the public good accrues to subjects in 
one's own room. The data are in Table 17. The effect is magnified by discussion although, 
somewhat surprisingly to me, discussion increases contributions even when the benefits 
go to others.108 
Table 17. % Contributions 
Give to 
Own Group Other Group 
No Discussion 37.5 19.6 
Discussion 78.6 30.4 
Brown-Kruse and Hummels (1992) also try to control for group identity by using a 
community versus non-community treatment . In their words: 
In the community v. noncommunity treatment , we controlled the nature 
of pre-experiment communication. By filling out a required questionnaire, 
subjects in the community setting were encouraged to meet, talk, and learn 
something about each other. Our goal was to arouse a sense of membership 
in a group. (Brown-Kruse and Hummels (1992) p .6 . 109) 
107That is, does the mere act of asking for predictions affect the rate of contribution? 
108They provide a second set of data, which shows that the opportunity of promising may be an 
important part in explaining the effect of discussion . This is further discussed in Orbell, Dawes, and van 
de Kragt (1990) . 
109! would like to thank J. Brown-Kruse for permission to quote from this report. 
63 
This is very similar to the irrelevant communications treatment of Dawes, McTavish 
and Shaklee (1977) .  Although only a small direct effect was found for community, the 
hypothesis of no effect can be rejected with only about 80% probability. A significant in­
teraction was found with marginal payoffs. When the MPCR was high contribution rates 
did not depend at all on the community treatment : When the MPCR was low, contribu­
tion rates depended strongly on the presence of the community treatment. Brown-Kruse 
and Hummels explain this using the concepts of trust and risk. Higher MPCRs mean 
lower risk, more community means more trust, and low risk · means trust. is unimportant 
while high risk means trust is important. 
We are left with the undefined and unmeasured concepts of discussion induced group 
solidarity (Orbell, van de Kragt and Dawes (1988) ) and trust (Brown-Kruse and Hummels 
( 1992)) to explain part of the rate of contribution. There may be something here but it 
has not yet been isolated, measured and controlled. 
3.4.3 Institutional 
Unanimity Building on an idea from Wicksell ( 1958) ,  Smith (1977, 1979a) identifies 
unanimity as a potentially important driving principle in generating contributions to­
wards public goods.11° The idea is that after contributions are proposed a vote is taken. 
A single no vote means contributions are returned and no public good is provided. These 
votes are more than just talk since they change the Nash equilibrium of the game. The 
hope is that this raises contributions since one can potentially contribute a lot but then 
veto if others do not contribute enough and so get one's money back. Banks, Plott , and 
Porter ( 1988) subjected these ideas to a very rigorous test in response to a proposal to 
use a mechanism like Smith's public good auction to allocate resources on Space Station 
Freedom .  This research is a nice example of the use of experiments to test the limits of 
a potentially useful idea for a new institution in a way that would be difficult if one were 
only able to use field data. Using the Isaac, McCue, and Plott environment , described 
earlier in Section 2.4, Banks, Plott, and Porter generated the data in Table 18. 
Table 18 .  Average Efficiencies 
For All Periods For Early Periods 
1 and 2 
with unanimity 8% 7% 
withouta unanimity 32% 53% 
a These data are from Isaac, McCue, and Plott (1985) 
For Later Periods 
� 3. 
8% 
21% 
The effect of unanimity is large and apparently obvious; efficiencies are way down and the 
effect of repetition disappears. A closer examination of the data reveal some clues . From 
1 1 0  A recent theoretical analysis is Bigman (1992) . 
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the data in Table 19  we see that unanimity does increase contributions if there are no 
vetos but there are so few success periods ( 13%) that the gain in potential contributions 
is outweighed by the failures. This effect is very similar to the effect of increases in 
thresholds observed in Section 3. 1 .  Since there is only this one study11 1 ,  one must be 
careful about leaping to conclusions but it seems likely that unanimity is not desirable as 
an institutional device to increase contributions, a fact that would have been impossible 
to discover with theory or field data. 
Table 19 .  
Efficiencies in 
Success Periodsa % Success Periods 
with unanimity 57.5 13 
without unanimity 32 100 
a A success period is one in which no veto occurs. 
Revision and Sequence Two other institutional variations may have a more positive 
effect on cooperation than unanimity. One, sequencing,112  has been tested in a threshold 
environment and one, revision, has been tested across different environments including 
an Isaac-Walker environment and a threshold environment . They each deserve further 
exploration. 
The idea of sequencing is not new113 but one of the first studies of its properties in 
public goods environments seems to be in Erev and Rapoport ( 1990) .  Sequencing allows 
or requires participants to make their decisions sequentially with complete information 
about previous decisions in the sequence. When there is a threshold this significantly 
changes the theoretical properties of the game. If one applies the modern notions of sub­
game perfection to a game in which the monetary public good is provided if and only if J( 
of N contribute then the theory predicts the last J( in the sequence will contribute and the 
good will always be provided efficiently. The data lend limited support to this conclusion. 
Using an environment similar to van de Kragt, Orbell, and Dawes (1983) requiring 3 
of 5 contributors, Erev and Rapoport found that the percentage of cooperation was 
essentially the same whether decisions were sequential (45.3%) or simultaneous (42.9%).  
However, under the sequential protocol the public good was provided 66.7% of the time 
1 1 1There have been. other mechanisms tested,with unanimity. Banks et al. ( 1988) also test Smith's 
auction process and obtain data similar to that in Tables 18 and 19. Smith et al . ( 1982) tested Oral 
Double Auctions with unanimity and found that the extramarginal units which were rationed out by the 
price system - as they should be - tended to veto the allocations and significantly reduce efficiencies. 
1 12This variation is clearly related to sequential protocols in bargaining such as ultimatum games . See 
chapter Roth ( 1994) . 
1 13See, for example, the work of Harstad and Marrese (1978, 1981 ,  1982) , or Cremer and Riordan 
(1982) . 
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whereas it was provided only 14% under the simultaneous protocol . 114 A sequential choice 
mechanism does not increase cooperation in this threshold environment but it does solve 
some of the coordination problem. Of 75 subject choices in the sequential mechanism, 
20 or 27% violated the predictions of game theory.115 No one knows why although the 
fact that most errors occurred in the early decisions (75% of the decisions which violate 
the theory were made by the first 3 movers) suggests that backward induction may be 
difficult for the subjects.116 Other possibilities are that early movers may anticipate 
mistakes by later movers or late movers may be spiteful. The .explanation-here must he 
somehow related to that of behavior in centipede games. (See McKelvey and Palfrey 
(1992) . )  Sequential protocols are a possible solution to coordination problems with small 
numbers .  They should be studied more. 
The idea of revision is also not new since it can be found in one of the oldest market 
institutions, the English Auction. Dorsey (1992) , using the Isaac, Walker, and Thomas 
(1984) design, with MPCR=.3 and N=4, made one change and allowed subjects to adjust 
their planned contributions in real time. Only the final contribution levels were binding. 
He found 1 1 .5% contribution rates when allowing both increases and decreases (compared 
to Isaac, Walker, and Thomas who found 26%) . Allowing increases only - a form of 
partial commitment - Dorsey found contribution rates of 23%. It is not obvious that 
revisions are helping in this public goods environment.117 In fact, they seem to give 
subjects an opportunity to discover others' less than fully cooperative behavior and to 
lower contributions upon that discovery. But more needs to be done before definite 
conclusions are possible. 
3 . 5  Unknown Effec ts 
There are a number of other possible treatments or phenomena which might affect con­
tributions or cooperation and which, as far as I know, have not been fully tested. Three 
of these are decision costs, attitudes of fairness, and moral suasion. Each is usually pre­
sented as a motivation beyond monetary gain which might cause the decisions of subjects 
to be different from those predicted by reward maximizing models. 
1 14Notice that the average (or % of) cooperation will not be the same as the % of time the good is 
provided. If cooperation is efficient and exactly 3 of 5 contribute each time then (3/2)(% cooperation) 
= % provision. 
1 15E.g. if exactly 2 of 5 ·have cooperated· and you are the 5tlrto move, you should cooperate. 
1 16John Kagel points out that "these results contrast to sequential games requiring 1 out of 2 to con­
tribute to the public good - where, with experience, subgame perfection works almost perfectly (Harrison 
and Hirschleifer (1989) . This supports the notion of the failure of backward induction argument, as these 
games involve only two moves compared to 5 ." 
1 17Ba.nks, Ledyard, and Porter (1989) found revisions very helpful in a private good, coordination 
problem. 
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Decision Costs Decision costs are related to bounded rationality and computational 
and informational complexity. Generally the idea is that precise optimization carries 
cognitive processing costs which are traded off by subjects against rewards: The lower 
the rewards the more errors in computation. While Smith and Walker (1992) address 
some of the issues in the context of private goods, it is difficult to identify any systematic 
study in the context of public goods. Two papers are vaguely related. Dawes and Orbell 
( 1982) report the results of an experiment using one of their standard dilemma designs 
with no threshold, with no communication and with losses truncated at zero in which 
they tried to check whether communication causes increases in contributions because it 
facilitates thinking. They allowed some subjects only 5 minutes to think about their 
choice and allowed others 24 hours. The results were clear and unequivocal: cooperation 
rates were 35.6% for 5 minutes and 35.9% for 24 hours. "Thinking time per se does not 
help." (p. 172 . )  In a second study related to decision costs ,  Saijo and Yamaguchi (1992) 
compare rates of contribution in an Isaac and Walker type design with MPCR=. 7 and 
1/ .7  and with N=7. They provide two different payoff tables to different subjects. One 
they call rough, similar to that provided by Isaac and Walker, provides two columns of 
data: "Total contributions" in increments of 10 and "Your (public good) Payoff." In the 
format they call detailed they provide a 61 x 1 1 matrix whose rows are "sum of others 
contributions" including all integers ranging from 0 to 60 and "your contribution" ranging 
from 0 to 10. The entries are "your (total) payoff." They obtain considerably different 
results with the detailed table than with the rough. Using the rough table and MPCR=.7, 
the rates of contribution and the decline with repetition mimic those in Isaac, Walker, and 
Thomas (1984) (see Section 2.5) : more than 30% contribution early with decay towards 
10%. With the detailed table "the mean investment for all ten periods is significantly less 
( 19.6% vs. 34.1%) than the previous experiments and no specific decay toward period 10  
is observed." (p . 10 . )  I t  seems from Saijo and Yamaguchi (1992) that reducing cognitive 
processing costs by providing the detailed table118 reduces contributions and eliminates 
the decline with repetition. This is consistent with a hypothesis that some subjects make 
errors (which are one-sided at 0) that they correct with repetition or with detail. This is 
a wide open area of research at the edge between psychology and economics . It is related 
to the issue of presentation raised in footnote 16. It certainly seems to me to be worth a 
lot more careful research. 
Fairness It is often claimed that non-reward maximizing behavior arises because of 
subjects' concerns for ·fairness .  There has been a lot of study or at least claims of this 
in bargaining experiments (see chapter Roth (1994) )  but very little has been done in 
the context of public goods. Marwell and Ames (1979) administered a survey as part of 
their experiment (see Section 2.3) and they suggest that the answers to that "suggests 
one major theme - the consideration of 'fairness '  as a mediating factor in investment 
118The detail table eliminates computation and interpolation but increases informational size from 
2 X 1 1  entries to 61 x 1 1  entries. Does this increase or decrease decision costs? 
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decisions." (p. 1357.) However, they also recognize that " . . .  investment in the public 
good did not vary with definitions of fairness" (p. 1357) where definition means what is 
a fair % of contribution. However, contributions did vary with a "concern for fairness." 
Those who were not so concerned were markedly concentrated in the lowest 
levels of investment. For these people, at least, "being fair" may be driven 
out by greed. If the stakes are high enough, almost everyone may opt for 
profit over fairness . But this would still deny the strong free-rider hypothesis 
for a large range of meaningful economic conditions. 
So here again is a possible explanation for contributions above those maximizing personal 
payoff. I am uncomfortable with the use of survey data and the fact that "concern for 
fairness" is not measurable, but nevertheless I think there is something which deserves 
to be followed up . One way would follow up on the theory presented in Section 3.3 .2 .  
Moral Suasion I include a final class of phenomena which are possible explanations 
for non-maximizing behavior under a general heading of moral suasion. We have already 
seen, in Section 2. 1 ,  how instructions in Bohm's experiments included what he called 
"counter-strategic arguments ." These are simply an extreme form of an effect which 
may lead subjects to make decisions as they think the experimenter wants them to. The 
existence of such an effect has seemingly been demonstrated weakly by Hoffman and 
Spitzer ( 1985) and by Hoffman, McCabe, Shachat, and Smith (1992) in the context of 
2 person bargaining experiments.119 The latter state in their abstract: "we conducted 
dictator experiments120 in which individual subject decisions could not be known either 
by the experimenter or by anyone else except the decision maker. The results yielded by 
far our largest observed proportion of self-regarding offers." The conjecture is that even 
if the experimenter can prevent subjects from knowing what each other do, the fact that 
the experimenter knows can still lead subjects to entertain other-regarding behavior. 
It would be interesting to know whether such protection from the experimenter (and 
not just from each other) is really important and whether it would significantly reduce 
contributions in any of the public goods situations we have described in this paper. 
Finally, one should notice that each of the three phenomena mentioned (decision 
costs , fairness, moral suasion) trades off against the private stakes. All experimenters 
including psychologists like Dawes and sociologists like Marwell recognize that "if the 
stakes are high enough almost everyone may opt for profit." It is indeed a systematic 
if not often replicated fact in experimental data that increasing the stakes (that is ,  for 
1 19These are discussed in chapter Roth (1994) . 
120Dictator experiments allow a subject to divide $10 between themselves and another. The other must 
accept the division. 
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example, doubling the value of each unit of endowment and doubling the value of each 
unit of the public good) reduces the contribution rate in dilemmas. 121 This is a matter 
of control. 
It is obvious that subjects bring motivations beliefs and capabilities to the lab that 
may be vastly different from those assumed in standard game-theoretic models . Some 
experimental situations such as Double Oral Auctions appear to be very robust against 
such variations. No control is needed. Some experimental situations such as voluntary 
contributions mechanisms with public goods are very sensitive to such variations. That 
sensitivity can be controlled with high payoffs but little is learned. The hard problem is 
to isolate and measure the effects of the variations. This will keep experimentalists busy 
for a long time. 
4 Final Thoughts 
What do we know about behavior in public goods environments? In particular, are 
subjects naturally cooperative} contributors, and altruistic ? Conventional wisdom is based 
on the data generated by Marwell and Ames, Dawes and Orbell, Isaac and Walker, 
and others in environments without thresholds. These suggest that in public goods 
experiments where the dominant payoff maximizing strategy is to give nothing and where 
the group optimum is to give everything, in one-shot decisions or in the early rounds of 
repetitive decisions contributions from 30% to 70% occur.122 There are at least two 
explanations for the data: (a) subjects trade off altruistic and cooperative responses 
against personal payoffs or (b) subjects make mistakes, do not care, are bored, and 
choose their allocations randomly. How can we tell the difference? Let us look at four 
recent papers which, I think, provide a. clue. Two use environments which retain a 
dominant strategy feature but test the hypothesis of natural cooperation by eliminating 
the conflict between group and self-interest .123 Two others study an environment with an 
interior Nash and interior social optimum so mistakes can be made by both contributing 
too much and contributing too little.124 
In Palfrey and Prisbrey (1993) and Saijo and Yamaguchi (1992) each subject faces 
an Isaac-Walker type payoff of ui = pi (z - ti) +  bi (L,j tj ) ·  Sometimes bi < pi < Nbi , so 
self-interest suggests ti = 0 and group interest suggests ti = z. But sometimes pi < bi 
so both group and self -regarding · behavior would · suggest ti = z .
' Palfrey and Prisbrey 
use an asymmetric information environment in which each subject has a different value 
12 1See, for example, Marwell and Ames (1980) , Palfrey and Prisbrey (1993) , and McKelvey and Palfrey 
(1992) , who test this hypothesis directly. 
122See, for example, Table 9 .  
1 23See Andreoni (1993a) and (1993b) for additional work like this. 
1 24In Dawes et al. ,  Marwell et al. ,  and Isaac et al , etc. the dominant strategy was t =  0. Only mistakes 
such that t > 0 are possible. 
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of b/p but each knows the common distribution that generates these values. Saijo and 
Yamaguchi use a complete information homogeneous environment where all subjects have 
the same b/p, all know it ,  and all are provided very detailed information on payoffs. The 
results, nevertheless ,  are remarkably similar. If we classify subjects as Nash players (a 
Palfrey and Prisbrey approach) if they contribute when bi > pi and do not contribute 
when pi > bi and if we allow some error,125 then Palfrey and Prisbrey find 49% Nash 
players . In Saijo and Yamaguchi in the first period of play 50% of the decisions (in 
the detailed treatment) are Nash. This increases to 62% by the last period.126 At least 
half the subjects are very close to behaving as self-payoff maximizing game theory would 
predict. 
What about the others? Are they cooperative? Again Saijo and Yamaguchi ( 1992) 
provides some clues. They used homogeneous groups of 7 with MPCR of .7 sometimes 
and 1 .4 other times. They also used a rough payoff table (similar to Isaac and Walker) 
and a very detailed table. The rates of contribution are listed in Table 20 . 
Table 20. Approx. % Contributions ( 1st period, 10th period, Average) 
MPCR=l .4  
MPCR=.7  
Rough Payoff Table Detailed Payoff Table 
50,45,50 75,70 ,72 
40,25,35 20,16 , 18 
The rough payoff data with MPCR=. 7 are similar to previous data of Isaac and Walker 
and others. What is surprising is the rough payoff data for MPCR=l .4. If one wants to 
interpret the 40% contribution with MPCR=.7  as contributory and the result of natural 
altruism or some other group regarding behavior, then one must also interpret the 50% 
lack of contribution with MPCR=l.4 as non-contributory and the result of natural spite­
fulness .  The alternative, that there are a lot of mistakes and inattention to payoff detail, 
seems more plausible to me. The 20% and 75% early rates of contribution, when payoffs 
are better explained to the subjects, supports that view but still leaves about 20%-25% 
of the aggregate contributions unexplained.127 What has not been controlled? 
1 25Palfrey and Prisbrey use a score maximizing procedure to do this. In Saijo and Yamaguchi ,  z=lO 
and I have arbitrarily allowed errors of 1 ; that is ,  ti=O or 1 is not giving and t;=9 or 10 is giving. 
126Two other interesting observations can also be made. First, initially there are 33% more Nash 
responses when MPCR=.7 and Nash is anti-group behavior than when MPCR=l/.7 and Nash is exactly 
progroup behavior . -This suggests ' to me that the explanation for contributions in one shot experiments 
with M PCR < 1 is not altruism. Second, classifying 10 and 9 when MPCR=.7 and 0 and 1 when 
MPCR= l/O. 7 as absolutely not Nash, we see 12% responses, with no decline, which are of this type 
evenly distributed between both values of MPCR. This suggests to me that, on average, about 10% of 
laboratory subjects may be simply immune to t.he control that experimenters try to exert by paying 
them. 
127 As I indicated in Section 3 . 3 . 1 ,  Palfrey and Prisbrey (1993) provide a probit estimation of individual 
decisions and suggest that 80% of the decisions can be explained by expected contribution= /[0:0 + 
0:1 ( M PC R)] . This also leaves about 20% unexplained . 
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Another approach to separating errors from altruism places the non-cooperative equi­
librium in the interior of (0, z] and separates that equilibrium from the group optimum. 
Both Andreoni ( 1993b) and Walker, Gardner, and Ostrom ( 1990) do this by introducing 
income effects .128 Andreoni (1993b) wanted to study whether government funding of the 
public good would crowd-out private contributions. He recognized that to do so required 
an environment with an interior non-cooperative equilibrium. He created an environment 
in which an individual's payoff is u = aln( z - ti) +  ( 1 - a ) ln(y ) ,  y = I:iiti , and 0 :S ti :S Zi . 
The first thing to note about . this world is that the non�cooperative .equilibrium (that 
generated by perfectly selfish game-theoretic behavior) is 
t* = 
( 1  - a) 
z 
1 + a(N - 1) 
so that for 0 < a < 1 ,  0 < t* < z. The second thing to notice is that the marginal per 
capita return (MPCR) to contributing is 
(ui /ui ) = 1 - a . � = 1 - a z - t y x  a y a  y 
which is not constant in z .  This is what is meant by income effects .  At the non­
cooperative equilibrium,129 t* ,  MPCR = 1 ,  so if the subjects' cooperative nature is 
similar to that in the linear world of Isaac and Walker, we should expect to see contri­
butions greater than t* .  If everyone is symmetric, we can identify a group optimum130 
as that i which maximizes aln(z - t) + (1 - a)lnNt. Thus i = (1 - a)z .  Notice that , 
for 0 < a < 1 and N > 1 ,  0 < t* < i < z,  and the MPCR at i is 'Jv for all subjects .131 
With this design it is possible for an experimentor to manipulate t* and i to see whether 
subjects respond or not. Andreoni 's data suggest that they do. Although he only used 
one set of para.meters with z = 7, t* = 3, and i = 6, contributions averaged 2 .84 over 
a number of periods and were bounded between 2 .11  and 3 .33 in each period. This is 
clearly near the non-cooperative equilibrium, is less than altruism would suggest , and is 
nowhere near the optimum. Although I have not analyzed these data to separate out the 
percentage of Nash players, this is certainly additional evidence supporting the conven­
tional wisdom that average rates of contribution are 50% may be the unintended result 
128 A simple theoretical exercise which would provide an interesting environment for an experiment 
is to determine an environment where every subject has a dominant strategy to contribute ti where 
0 < ti < z and where the group optimum t 0  is such that t 0  f:. E�N'  ti . 
129For any utility/payoff functions the · MPCR, for all players, will equal 1 at an interior Nash 
equilibrium. 
130If there are asymmetries and either xi f:. xi or zi f:. zi then it is not clear what a group optimum 
is. Instead, there are many Pareto-optima. If the subjects are maximizing their total take then the best 
function to maximize is :Eiui . But this may leave some subjects very badly off. 131 As N grows, t goes to zero while i stays constant and the MPCR at i goes to 0. To get some idea of 
the strength of the incentives consider a =  � and N = 10 .  Then, 1i �5%, f =33%, and M PCR(t} = . 10 .  
To make it  possible to  keep MPCR at  i constant in  N one must use a CES utility function. 
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of a corner non-cooperative equilibrium and not altruism. 132 
Another study which, serendipitously, was based on an environment with an interior 
non-cooperative equilibrium is that by Walker, Gardner, and Ostrom ( 1990) . In their 
attempt to understand common property management problems ,  they created a public 
good world where ui = xiy + pxi , g(Exj) = F(Exj)/("I'.xj ) ,  and imposed the constraint 
0 S xi < z. The particular F( ) they used was 23x - .25x2 with p = 5 .  One can do the 
same analysis here as we did above to Andreoni's environment to find that t* is 8 and i is 
4. One very interesting feature here is that t* and i are reversed so that 0 < i < t* < z .  
Ostrom, Walker, and Gardner found that contributions tended to be around t * ,  the Nash 
equilibrium, providing more evidence against the simple altruism model of behavior. 
Although no one has yet created an experimental study133 which would more closely 
compare the data from environments with interior non-cooperative equilibria to those 
without , the above experiments suggest that it would be worth the effort. If, as I suspect, 
the data in environments with interior Nash equilibria continues to be close to that 
predicted by non-cooperative behavior and if that is true for N =4, 10 ,  40, 100 ,  then we 
would certainly need a close reexamination of the stylized fact that subjects contribute 
40-60% of the optimal level because they are naturally group-regarding. 
Let me conclude with some persona.I conjectures and beliefs arrived at while writing 
this survey. ( 1 )  Hard-nosed game theory cannot explain the data. Subjects contribute 
even though non-contribution is a dominant strategy. Even the most fervent economic 
experimentalist can not force rates of contribution much below 10% (see Isaac, McCue, 
and Plott ( 1985) ) .  If these experiments are viewed solely as tests of game theory, that 
theory has failed. (2) Contributions are however certainly responsive to marginal selfish 
payoffs. (See Isaac, Walker, and Thomas ( 1984) and Palfrey and Prisbrey (1993) . )  Most 
of the 50% who are not Nash players seem to respond on average to selfish incentives. 
This is certainly consistent with the view that altruism, self-interest , decision costs ,  and 
fairness (among other possibilities) are all competing with each other in a subject's true 
preferences. A task facing experimentalists is to separate the effect of these forces from 
132 A methodological point to Andreoni's study must be noted with respect to the inducement of 
preferences, ui . Rather than tell them the function - which they might not understand - he gave 
them a matrix; their ti as the column, the sum of others ti 's as the row and the entry's were ui = 
aln(z - t i ) + (1 - o:)lnti + �#iti . As with Saijo and Yamaguchi this presentation of the data seems to 
provide subjects with computational help that leads them to choose more self-interestedly. The fact that 
the form of the payoff table affects behavior confirms the very delicate and sensitive nature of public 
good experiments and the need for better control if data are to be accepted. 
An experimental design problem, as we move to more complicated environments, will be how to induce 
very complicated non-linear preferences with income effects and substitution among many (more than 
2) dimensions. At some point experimenta.lists must let go of their simple world in which marginal 
willingness to pay schedules are the same as demand functions. Of course that is harder to control and 
will require new procedures. 
1331saac and Walker have responded to an early version of this paper by doing so but I have not yet 
seen the full set of data and analysis. 
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ea.ch other. (3) Altruism or group-regarding preferences cannot explain the data. When 
the conflict between group interest and self-interest is removed, subjects still contribute 
in ways that a.re counter to both their self interest and their group interest. ( See Sa.ijo 
and Yamaguchi (1992) . )  Up to 50% of the subjects appear to be solely self-interested 
when they understand the experimental situa.tion.134 ( See Palfrey and Prisbrey (1993) . )  
Further, experience, repetition, better detail in payoffs, and information a.bout hetero­
geneity reduce the apparent altruistic instinct of 30-40% of other subjects. ( 4) It is 
possible to provide an environment in which at least 90% of subjects will become selfish 
Nash-players. Heterogeneous payoffs and resources, complete and detailed information 
particularly a.bout the heterogeneity, anonymity from others and the experimenter, rep­
etition and experience, and low marginal payoffs will all ca.use a. reduction in rates of 
contribution especially with small numbers. Add unanimity to the mechanism and rates 
will go to zero. (See Banks, Plott and Porter (1988) . )  It is possible to extinguish any 
trace of "altruism" in the lab . (5) It is possible to provide an environment in which 
almost all of the subjects contribute towards the group interest. Homogeneous interest , 
little or rough information, face to face discussions in small groups, 135 no experience, 
small numbers and high marginal payoffs from contributing will all ca.use an increase in 
contributions. Why and how often this all works remains a. mystery. (6) There appear 
to be three types of players: dedicated Na.sh players who a.ct pretty much as predicted 
by game theory with possibly a. small number of mistakes, a. group of subjects who will 
respond to self-interest as will Na.sh players if the incentives a.re high enough but who 
also make mistakes and respond to decision costs, fairness, altruism, etc. , and a. group 
of subjects who behave in an inexplicable (irrational?)  manner. Casual observation sug­
gests the proportions a.re 50%, 40%, 10% in many subject pools . We, of course, need a. 
lot more data. before my outrageous conjectures can be tested. 
Let me finish with one pessimistic and one optimistic observation from the point of 
view of the mechanism designer. My pessimistic remark is that although inexperienced 
subjects can be led to provide large contributions in one-time decisions with the use 
of relevant discussions, one cannot rely on these approaches as a. permanent organiz­
ing feature without expecting an eventual decline to self-interested behavior. Thus, for 
example, techniques such as TQM (Tota.I Quality Management) ,  political orations, and 
ha.If-time speeches can have at best a. transitory effect in calling upon the altruistic im­
pulses of some. Ultimately self-interest takes over. My optimistic remark is that since 
90% of subjects seem to be responsive to private incentives, it will be possible to create 
new mechanisms which focus tha.t . self�interest towards , the group interest. We need not 
rely on voluntary contributions approaches but can instead use new organizations such 
as those found in Smith (1979a.) , Groves and Ledyard (1977) , or Ledyard and Palfrey 
(1992) .  Experiments will provide the basic empirical description of behavior which must 
134Even Isaac, Walker, and Williams find 38% Nash-behavior in their large group - no money experi­
ments by round 10 .  
1350ne unanswered question is  how or whether this works in large (N 2: 40) groups. 
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be understood by the mechanism designer and experiments will provide the test-bed in 
which the new organizations will be tested before implementation. But that is another 
paper. 
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Appendix 
Examples of Public Good Environments 
Endowment Production, G(ts )  Feasible, ti Sample Reference 
z 
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z 
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�ts 
�ts 
1 if ts � � 
0 else 
yl if ai < ts � a2 
y// if a2 < ts � a3 
yeY 
iJts 
iJts 
F(ts) /ts 
n-1 (xs )  
y = Xs 
Ej - wi = Eiwi 
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